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This thesis describes and analyzes a possible deployment
posture for the Soviet ballistic missile submarine force.
It examines the proposition that the Soviet Navy will estab-
lish a point defense, labeled "Close Aboard Bastions"
(CABs) , for its ballistic missile submarine fleet within the
Soviet claimed 12 nautical mile territorial sea. This is a
logical derivation of the currently widely held view that
the Soviets will establish a "bastion" defense for the
strategic portion of their seagoing forces. The thesis
concludes that the postulated CAB strategy is a viable








II. SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE STRATEGY 4
A. INTRODUCTION 4
B. EVOLUTION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS 5
C. DEVELOPMENT OF A WITHHOLDING STRATEGY:
THE BASTIONS 12
D. THE ORIGINS OF THE WITHHOLDING STRATEGY 13
E. MANIFESTATION OF WITHHOLDING: THE
BASTION THEORY 15
F. BASTION EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS 2 3
G. CONCLUSIONS 28
III. THE CLOSE ABOARD BASTION CONCEPT 32
A. INTRODUCTION 32
B. TACTICAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF THE CAB 3 3
C. MECHANICS OF CAB DEFENSES 39
D. STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES OF THE CAB 51
IV. LEGAL AND POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS TO THE
CAB CONCEPT 60
A. INTRODUCTION ' 60
B. THE LAW OF THE SEA AND SOVIET NAVAL POLICY — 61
C. POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF A CAB STRATEGY 74
IV
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 9594;
V. DISADVANTAGES OF THE CAB POSTURE 80
A. INTRODUCTION 80





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 105
THESIS DISCLAIMER
The views and judgments presented in this thesis are
those solely of the author. They do not necessarily reflect
official positions held by the Naval Postgraduate School,
the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or
any other U.S. government agency or organization. No
citation of this work may include references or attributions




This thesis examines the proposition that the Soviet
fleet will establish a point defense for its ballistic
missile submarine fleet within the Soviet claimed 12
nautical mile territorial sea. This is a logical derivation
of the currently widely held view that the Soviets will
establish a "bastion" defense for the ballistic missile
submarine portion of their naval forces. This research
effort focuses on what may be seen as a "planned
progression" of the Soviet Bastion Concept, the tightening
of the bastion position, and the subsequent freeing up of




The three basic methods of research employed in
examining this question are: (1) hardware analysis, (2)
literature content analysis, and (3) trend extrapolation.
All research and data were derived from unclassified
sources. Earlier analyses by various specialists on the
subject at hand are reviewed and examined to help define
postulated Soviet SSBN defensive concepts. The term chosen




Although the primary thrust of this thesis is a
discussion of the CAB concept, an introductory discussion of
the evolution of Soviet military strategy, and nuclear
strategy in particular, is necessary. Chapter II discusses
the development of Soviet SSBN operations and doctrine since
the 1960s, including the evaluation of the current (1988)
Western estimate of Soviet SSBN capabilities and intentions,
popularly known as the "bastion" concept.
Chapter III examines the evidence in support of the CAB
construct in terms of military strategy, political control,
international legal implications and Western anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) capabilities and constraints. Chapter III
argues the logic of the CAB as a plausible evolution in a
thoroughly integrated Soviet nuclear strategy.
Chapter IV examines the potential pitfalls and risks of
a Soviet CAB deployment strategy. The ability of Western
forces to penetrate these defensive positions, the limited
maneuver area for SSBNs positioned close along the Soviet
coast and the CAB's potential vulnerability to Western
strategic counterbattery fire, are problems addressed.
Chapter V discusses the possible ramifications of the
CAB strategy for the future in context of the future
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks [START] regime. In addition,
the future role of the Soviet SSBN force is discussed in the
framework of the CAB concept. Implications for escalation
control and the U.S. maritime strategy are also reviewed.
Chapter VI provides a summary and conclusion. In
addition, possible areas are identified which in the future
may provide some further evidence supporting the existence
of the CAB. To place the SSBN force strategy and doctrine
in perspective, the larger military and political goals are
summed in relation to support of the CAB concept.
II. SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE STRATEGY
A. INTRODUCTION
Soviet military, including nuclear strategy, has evolved
in a distinctly different way from that of the United
States. The evolution of the Soviet Union's fleet of
nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
provides a clear example of this difference. In both
weapons design and deployment, the Soviet force has
displayed a logical progression toward a specific end:
namely the creation of a secure strategic reserve, withheld
physically and operationally to provide intrawar deterrence.
It is the purpose of this section to examine two major
facets of the evolution of the Soviet SSBN force. First,
first considered is the evolution of basic "hardware
capabilities," from the Yankee class SSBN and the SS-N-6
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) to the latest
Soviet SSBN, the Typhoon and the SS-N-2 SLBM. Next
considered is the evolution of the Soviet SSBN fleet's
withholding strategy. By examining these two developments
the next stage of Soviet SSBN evolution can become clear,
namely the proposition that the Soviet Union will conduct
SSBN withholding operations within the coastal waters of the
Soviet Union.
B. EVOLUTION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS
1. The Yankee Class Submarine
The Yankee class SSBN, introduced operationally in
1968, was the natural evolution of earlier Soviet ballistic
missile designs, notably the nuclear-powered Hotel, and
diesel-driven Golf classes. Two key advantages of the
Yankee over its predecessors were a very much larger SLBM
loadout (16 versus three weapons) and the ability to launch
from a submerged condition. 1 The Yankee class capabilities
met the demands of Soviet military doctrine of the period.
That doctrine viewed "modern war" as one in which nuclear
weapons played a decisive role. Marshal Vasiliy D.
Sokolovskiy, editor of the first edition (1962 book) of
Military Strategy expressed the contemporary Soviet views on
the nature of a future world war:
From the point of view of the means of armed combat, a
third world war will be first of all a nuclear rocket war.
The mass use of nuclear, particularly thermo-nuclear,
weapons will impart to the war an unprecedented
destructive nature. 2
The role of the Yankee class in this "all or
nothing" strategy was dictated, in part, by its weapons
system. Table 1 displays the main characteristics of the
Yankee class weapons system, the SS-N-6 Serb.
1James D. Watkins, Understanding Soviet Naval Affairs ,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1985, p. 103.
2As cited in The Soviet Art of War . Scott, Harriet and




System Range Yield (CEP 3 )
SS-N-6 Mod I 2400 km .5-1 megaton 1.3 km
SS-N-6 Mod III 3000 km 500 kilotons 1.3 km
(2 RVs)
Source: The Military Balance , International
Institute for Strategic Studies, London,
England, 1988, p. 206.
The characteristics listed in Table 1 influenced the
operating behavior of the Soviet SSBN fleet in two different
ways. First, to be available for immediate strikes, patrol
areas were limited to forward areas, subject to hostile
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) forces. Secondly the
relatively low accuracy of the SS-N-6 meant that targets
would be limited to "soft" counterforce or wide area
countervalue objectives, e.g., Strategic Air Command (SAC)
bomber bases, industrial concentrations and so forth. The
combination of these two limitations made the Yankee only an
evolutionary step in SSBN development, but a development
which enabled the Soviet Union to implement not the
preferred strategy, but an adeguate one.
The Yankee patrol areas within striking range of the
continental United States were necessarily at great distance
3 CEP (circular error probable) is defined as radius of
a circle centered on the target in which 50% of all weapons
are expected to land.
from the Soviet Union. This meant that the Yankees had to
transit waters patrolled by U.S. and Allied ASW forces. It
followed that, faced with superior Western ASW capability,
the survivability of the Yankee class could not be
guaranteed. As a corollary, the Yankees on "forward patrol"
were virtually faced with the choice of "using or losing"
their SS-N-6s.
2. The Early Delta Class Submarines: Delta I/II
The Soviet Union has traditionally relied on
incremental weapon systems improvement. Incorporated in the
construction of the Yankee class was a baseline nuclear
power plant and engineering system which allowed for growth
potential to replace the initial inferior weapon system.
This early commitment to a single hull type enabled series
production without requiring a massive retooling effort by
the Soviet shipyards for subsequent improvements . The
built-in room to expand the capabilities required in the
future was and is a key design feature of Soviet systems. 4
Accordingly, even while the Yankee class was first being
deployed, the design of its successor, the Delta class, had
already been completed. 5 The Delta class resolved the two
4Richard Haver, "The Soviet Submarine Force," James L.
George, ed.
, The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The
View from the Mid-1980s . Naval Institute Press, Annapolis
Maryland, p. 127.
5Jan S. Breemer, "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions:
Evidence, Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," Journal of
the Royal United Services Institute . London England, March
1985, p. 22.
principal drawbacks of the Yankee. The Delta's SS-N-8 could
strike from Soviet homewaters without necessarily making the
dangerous transit through contested waters, and the missile
itself carried a more capable warhead than the SS-N-6. On
the other hand, as long as the Delta still utilized the
basic propulsion and HME design of the Yankee, the first two
series of the Delta class (Delta I and II) , were no more
able to elude acoustic detection than had been their Yankee
predecessor. 6 The key to a secure open ocean submarine
weapons system is the ability to avoid detection. The
potential patrol areas for the Delta class, while greater in
terms of area, did little to address the acoustic
vulnerability problem. Any transit which exposed the Yankee
and Delta classes to potential interception by Western ASW
forces placed their survivability in question. Table 2
lists the main characteristics of the Delta/SS-N-8 weapons
systems.
The Soviet Union's incremental design philosophy is
clearly seen in the development of the next series of the
Delta class, the Delta III and IV.
6Tom Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare .









SS-N-8 mod I 7800 km .5-1 Megaton 1.3 km
SS-N-8 mod II 9100 km . 8 Megaton .9 km
Source: The Military Balance 1987-1988. IISS, London
England, p. 206.
3 . The Follow-On Delta Class: Delta III/IV
The next step in the evolutionary growth of Soviet
SSBN platforms came via the enlarged Delta III and Delta IV
variants. The continued combination of the existing Yankee-
Delta hull configuration with more advanced missiles systems
was noted by Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, Richard
Haver:
The Yankee/Delta family of submarines represents the
largest single production run of nuclear submarines in
history. The Delta, a descendant of the Yankee designed
in the middle to late 1950s, is still being produced. The
Soviets settled on a basic design for large-scale
production and then fitted improved weapon systems into
the basic package and later into refitted and converted
units. The Soviets have built 72 of these units with more
to come. 7
The improvements to the Delta missile system came
via the SS-N-18, missile deployed in three variants, and the
SS-N-23. The major improvements over the older missile
systems included the use of Multiple Independently Targeted
7Haver, "The Soviet Submarine Force," p. 125
Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) , thereby increasing potential
target coverage, and providing greater accuracy. 8 In
addition the engineering plant in the Delta IV is more
powerful than its predecessors. 9 Table 3 depicts the




System Range Yield Accuracy
SS-N-18 mod 1 6500 km 500 kilotons (3 RVs) 1 . 4 km
SS-N-18 mod 2 8000 km 500 kilotons (1 RV) .9 km
SS-N-18 mod 3 6500 km 500 kilotons (5 RVs) .9 km
SS-N-23 8300 km 100 kilotons? (lORVs) <.9 km
Source: The Military Balance 1987-88 . IISS, p. 206.
4 . The Typhoon
The Typhoon is the worlds largest nuclear submarine,
with a displacement 25% greater than that of the U.S. Ohio
class SSBN. Armed with 20 MIRVed missiles capable of
striking all U.S. targets from pierside, it may be regarded
as the ultimate Soviet weapon for implementing the strategy
8Stefanik, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare , pp. 155-156.
9John E. Moore, ed. , Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-87 .
Jane's Publishing Co., New York, New York, 1987, p. 535.
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of a secure strategic reserve. 10 The embarked SLBM, the SS-
N-20 is credited with a range of 8300 km and is estimated to
be armed with between six and 12 re-entry vehicles. 11 Table
4 shows the characteristics of the Typhoon/SS-N-2 0.
TABLE 4
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TYPHOON
Weapon Warhead Accuracy
System Range Yield (CEP)
SS-N-20 8300 km 100 Kilotons .5 km
Source: The Military Balance. 1987-1988 . IISS, p. 206.
This latest Soviet SSBN development leads to several
observations. First, the huge size of the unit provides the
same growth potential that the earlier Yankee did 2 years
prior. 12 Secondly, the key design features, long range and
extreme size, have apparently not been utilized to expand
the patrol areas to the ocean at large. Instead the
Typhoon appears designed with an eye on extended and "local"
under ice operations. 13
10Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-87 . p. 534.
i:LWatkins, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments , p.
100. Various sources cite from six to nine to 12 re-entry
vehicles for the SS-N-20.
12Haver, "The Soviet Submarine Force," p. 126.
13Haver, "The Soviet Submarine Force," p. 12 6.
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C. DEVELOPMENT OF A WITHHOLDING STRATEGY: THE BASTIONS
This section traces the evolution of the Soviet Union's
SSBN withholding strategy, and associated defensive posture,
generally known as the Soviet SSBN "bastion" strategy. The
proposition that the evolution of a secure strategic reserve
has been the ultimate goal of the Soviet SSBN force since
its inception is examined and developed. It is further
argued that this goal might culminate ultimately in the
development of a CAB strategy.
1. Roles of the Soviet SSBN Force
Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
according to Western analysts, Soviet strategic thought
centered on several key concepts. First, the use of nuclear
weapons in an initial counterforce role was recognized as a
clear option in a confrontation with the United States. 14
Second, the Soviet Union recognized a need for a survivable
strategic reserve for the purpose of a secure force for
intrawar deterrence including the deterrence of U.S. second
strike countervalue retaliation against Soviet cities. 15
While adapting the Svoiet strategic force posture to this
new requirment, the Soviets seized upon their SSBNs as a key
contributor to a strategic reserve.
14James McConnell, "The Soviet Naval Mission Structure:
Past, Present, and Future," Soviet and Other Communist
Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s . James L. George, ed,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis Maryland, p. 47.
15McConnell, "The Soviet Naval Mission Structure:
Past, Present, and Future," p. 38.
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D. THE ORIGINS OF THE WITHHOLDING STRATEGY
Western naval analysts and scholars have long sought to
rank-order the various roles and mission that the Soviet
navy may be called on to execute in time of war. A general
consensus exists on the following ranking of missions
developed by Robert W. Herrick:
Deterrence in peace and war, primarily through strategic
submarines, related to this role is the "function" of
providing naval protection for the submarines.
Protection of the homeland against seaborne attack,
whether from amphibious invasion, strikes by aircraft
launched from aircraft carriers, or missiles fired from
naval platforms.
Naval "combat support" for the coastal flanks of the
ground forces of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries.
Delivery by strategic submarines and long-range naval
missile bombers of "operational" nuclear strikes against
targets in the coastal areas located within the confines
of the "sea and oceanic" theaters of military operations.
Protection and promotion of the USSR's "state interest" at
sea in peace and war. 16
This hierarchy of roles and missions places a great
burden on Soviet naval forces. To defend the SSBN force and
attempt to attrite the West's SSBNs may be asking too much
of submarines that are generally believed to be
technologically inferior to those of the West. Despite
disagreement among some Western analysts as to what may
16Robert Herrick, "Roles and Missions of the Soviet
Navy: Historical Evolution, Current Priorities, and Future
Prospects," James L. George, ed. , The Soviet and Other
Communist Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s , Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, p. 27.
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constitute the most important Soviet naval wartime
requirement, i.e., "strategic strike" or "strategic defense"
it is sufficient for the purpose of this thesis that it is a
mission requirement that will be carried out to the best of
Soviet ability.
The initial evidence of a Soviet withholding strategy
came from Western analysis of Soviet open source military
literature in the early 1970s. James M. McConnell, an
analyst with the Center for Naval Analysis, was probably the
first to recognize that the Soviet SSBN force had assumed a
key role in the Soviet concept of intrawar deterrence and
war termination. The Soviets, according to McConnell,
provided evidence of this intention with the introduction of
the Delta SS-N-8 class submarines. 17
By the summer of 1981, McConnell' s findings had been
widely accepted within and outside the U.S. Navy
intelligence community. Then Director of Naval
Intelligence, Rear Admiral Shapiro, reported at that time
A surprising unanimity that the Soviets will utilize a
majority of their General Purposes forces to support
their SSBNs in protected sanctuaries. This SSBN Bastion
strategy and its associated use of SSBNs as strategic
reserve forces is becoming widely accepted by key Soviet
analysts, both in and out of government. 18
17McConnell, "The Soviet Naval Mission Structure:
Past, Present, and Future," p. 47.
18
"Report on Annual Office of Naval Intelligence
Symposium," Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence,
Ser. Op-009J2/135, 24 August 1981 p. 1.
14
Another analyst, Michael MccGwire, has since elaborated
on the operational implications of this "bastion" strategy:
The 1970s concept of operations was predicated on avoiding
escalation to an intercontinental exchange: to achieve
this the insurance force would have to be held secure
against determined attempts by the enemy to draw down its
numbers. This coupled with the requirement for effective
command and control , meant that the insurance force would
need to be deployed close to Soviet bases, where such
defense could most easily be mounted, the force would also
need missiles with the range to strike at North America
from home waters. 19
This withholding concept at once establishes both a need
and method to ensure the survivability of SSBNs. Clearly,
an important requirement for the Soviet SSBN fleet is
survivability. Rather than disperse their fleet of Deltas
in the greater than 30 million square miles of water that
are theoretically available by virtue of the SS-N-8/SS-N-
18' s ong range, the Soviets have chosen to place them in
sanctuaries adjacent to the Soviet Union. 20 The means of
withholding is of secondary importance to the rationale, yet
it is of critical import for the Soviet Navy.
E. MANIFESTATION OF WITHHOLDING: THE BASTION THEORY
An important strategic drawback of an SSBN withholding
posture is that the resulting "fleet in being" becomes an
19Michael MccGwire, "Contingency Plans for World War,"
The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: A View from the Mid-
1980s . James L. George, ed. , Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, Maryland, 1985, p. 67.
20Donald Daniel, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower
Strategic Stability . University Press, Urbana, Illinois, p.
103.
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extremely attractive target for an opponent anxious to gain
war termination leverage. Accordingly, it makes sense for
the Soviets to provide their SSBNs with a "layer" of active
defense forces. James Tritten has pointed out that:
...open literature evidence includes a declaratory policy
for the active defense of Soviet SSBNs. Such a defense
would bait Western navies to combat in areas chosen by the
USSR. It would allow for protection of Soviet fleet
assets and the homeland while simultaneously providing for
the destruction of major enemy groupings. Calling this
are of active defense a "bastion" seems proper. 21
The extent to which the Soviet navy has committed its
general purpose forces to a "pro-SSBN" mission has aroused
much controversy among naval analysts. There are distinct
schools of thought regarding the bastion concept. One,
represented by Jan S. Breemer, is that adequate evidence for
the wartime existence of the bastions is lacking. 22 The
lack of explicit discussion by the Soviets on their own
intentions for their SSBN force preclude definitive
conclusions. The second—and dominant—school holds that
the Soviets will protect their SSBNs in near home waters by
way of a defense in-depth that extends 2000-3000 kilometers
from the Soviet coastline. 23 This second argument is one
21James J. Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear
War , Westview press, Boulder, Colorado, p. 66.
22 Breemer, "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence,
Inference and Alternative Scenarios", p. 22.
23 RADM William O. Studeman, Director Of Naval
Intelligence, Testimony from House Armed Services Sub-
Committee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials,
Washington D.C., 1 March 1988, p. 3.
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of the key planning assumptions underlying the U.S. Maritime
Strategy. 24
1. Do the Bastions Exist?
Writing in the spring of 1985, Jan Breemer noted
that, while naval analysts had reviewed a plethora of facts
and Soviet literature, very little had been said by the
Soviets directly to provide evidence that SSBNs would be
shepherded into bastions. 25
Breemer' s arguments against the bastion concept are
summarized in these three points:
1. The Soviet SSBN construction program has evolved
towards large nuclear-powered platforms, with their
incumbent high costs and greater capabilities. If the
SSBNs are to be kept in bastions, Breemer argues the
Soviets might arguably be better served by deploying
their SLBMs in a larger number of smaller and
conventionally powered missile carrying boats.
2. If ballistic missile submarines are to be placed in
local bastion waters, the Soviets may have solved the




Coordinated Soviet defense of these bastioned SSBNs
would be extremely difficult for the Soviet command
and control system, a task in which target acquisition
and prosecution would be exacerbated by false contacts
etc. 26
24The Maritime Strategy , James A. Barber ed. , United
States Naval Institute, Annapolis Maryland, January 1988, p.
7.
25Breemer, "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence,
Inference and Alternative Scenarios," p. 22.
26Breemer, "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence,
Inference and Alternative Scenarios," pp. 22-23.
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In his skepticism on the Bastion theory, Breemer is
not alone. Admiral Harry D. Train, former Commander in
Chief Atlantic Fleet, is amongst those who question the
bastion concept. Train cites the establishment of the "sea
bridge across the Atlantic" as a key to Western success in
Central Europe. 27 As a corollary, argues Train, disruption
of the Atlantic SLOCs "must" be the Soviet Navy's priority.
Yet the priority of a Soviet anti-SLOC campaign is
discounted by most analysts. 28 Further, the appearance of
the occasional Delta class making a South Atlantic
deployment leads Admiral Train to question the wisdom of
concluding that bastions are the order of the day for the
Soviet navy. 29
In sum, these analysts find that the bastion concept
cannot be disproven, neither is the evidence sufficient to
prove its existence as the Soviet de facto strategy for
peace and war. While acknowledging the importance of
analyzing Soviet military literature, Breemer cautions
against overreliance on reading between the lines. This is
27Harry Train, "Commentary," Soviet and Other Communist
Navies: A View from the Mid-1980s , James L. George, ed.
,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis Maryland, 1985, p. 285.
28Soviet Military Power 1988 , Department of Defense,
Washington D.C., 1988, p. 83. Despite this majority
opinion, this is an area of naval warfare that would
directly contribute to the Soviet Army effort in Central Europe.
29As cited in Jan S. Breemer "The U.S. Maritime
Strategy: A Reappraisal," Armed Forces Journal . May 1987,
p. 5.
18
a key point. The arcane world of Soviet doublespeak on any
issue indeed makes absolute conclusions very difficult. In
the instance of a fleet effort involving the entire, or
"bulk" of the Soviet Navy's general purpose forces to
protect the SSBN force, it would seem that the purists of
literature analysis ignore the military reality of what type
of naval campaign will impact a war fought in Western
Europe. Allocating only minimal forces to engage in this
type of traditional naval tasks makes little warfighting
sense. 30
2 . A Case For Bastions
The prevailing view of the Bastion concept is
indebted, in large part, to the work of James M. McConnell.
McConnell asserts that the ascendancy of the withholding
strategy led the SSBN force to be equipped with the
survivable withholding capability inherent in the Delta/SS-
N-8 weapons system. The extreme range developed in that
SLBM made the force "survivable to the last day of the
war". 31
Mcconnell's work in the early 1970s relied on
political-military literature analysis and provided the
30Perhaps the Soviets are quite pleased with the
Western interpretation of their SSBN strategy. After all,
rare is the opportunity to plan for an opponent who
dismisses the worst case as not being in line with a
strategy that is only inferred at best.
31McConnell, "The Soviet Naval Mission Structure:
Past, Present and Future", p. 47.
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initial evidence that the Soviets had adopted a withholding
strategy. A student of the writings of Admiral Gorshkov,
Mcconnell typically refers to the Soviet Admiral's
statements in Gorshkov' s book Seapower and the State , in
support of the role of the importance of the SSBN fleet:
It is particularly important to note that submarines have
become the main branch of the forces of fleets. A major
role is also played by the new strategic orientation of
the fleets for struggle against the shore. All this is
making more necessary the all-around backing of the
actions of the forces solving strategic tasks. Therefore
the struggle to create in a particular area of a theatre
and in a particular time, favorable conditions for
successfully solving by a large grouping of forces of the
fleet the main tasks facing it and at the same time
creating conditions such as would make it more difficult
for the enemy to fulfil his task and prevent him from
frustrating the actions of the opposing side will
apparently be widely adopted. 32
In addition many references in Soviet literature to
"combat stability" and frequent criticism of the Germans in
World War II for their alledged failure to provide combined
arms support for their submarine operations leave a strong
impression that the Soviets intend to provide defensive
measures for their SSBNs. 33
Michael MccGwire, incorporating a more catholic
approach incorporating both hardware analysis and literature
32Sergei Gorshkov, Seapower and the State . Pergamon
Press, London United Kingdom, 1975, p. 233. The statement
"forces solving strategic tasks" is assumed to mean SSBNs by
the author.
33
"Combat stability" in the sense that survivability to
carry out the mission is obviously critical. Further, the
Germans in WWII operated their U-Boats alone without
assistance of surface units or air cover.
20
review, cites other evidence of a bastion scheme. Specifi-
cally, MccGwire raises these two issues:
1. Until such time as the missile submarines have fired
all their missiles or have been deployed to open
ocean, they must be kept secure against attack—this
has led to the concept of defended ocean bastions.
2. If the submarines have been deployed, they must be
able to transit Western antisubmarine barriers in
reasonable safety and to survive attempts to find them




MccGwire has also pointed out that the plethora of
Soviet surface ships built since 1965 through the late 1970s
have a strong ASW orientation. MccGwire initially
attributed the new generation of ASW combatants to a Soviet
"anti-SSBN" mission, but subsequently concluded that the new
classes embodied the new "pro-SSBN" protection requirement.
In any case, strategic ASW against U.S. SSBNs was, and is,
beyond the capability of the Soviet navy. 35
Belatedly allowing for the importance of SSBN
protection, MccGwire acknowledged, in the late 197 0s, the
bastions as a necessary requirement for SSBN protection. He
does not believe, however, that this is a permanent state of
affairs. MccGwire cites development of other survivable
34Whether the SSBNs require a convoy to be safely
shepherded out into the open ocean is not the only issue
here. There might be a further mission for support forces
to breach Western defenses to allow the SSBNs to sortie.
Michael MccGwire, "Soviet American Naval Arms Control,"
Quester, George, ed. Navies and Arms Control . Praeger Press,
New York N.Y., 1980, p. 54.
35Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare , p. 72.
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strategic systems as evidence that the SSBN is only part of
a strategic reserve, and that road mobile and rail mobile
systems may end the need for a bastion strategy. 36
In terms of shipbuilding programs, larger surface
units were required, not to enhance anti-carrier warfare
capabilities, but to increase pro-SSBN ASW capabilities out
to 2 500 kilometers [the range of the Tomahawk cruise
missile]. 37 The largest Soviet combatants have considerable
ASW capability at the expense of strike warfare. The
Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing [VSTOL] carriers all
carry Yak-3 6 Forger aircraft, but more importantly are
equipped with hull mounted and variable depth sonars. 38
The trend to build units which can adequately
support the bastion defense can be traced to other types of
Soviet naval units as well. The 11-38 May as and the Tu-95
Bear F aircraft have improved the capability of Soviet Naval
Aviation (SNA) for open ocean ASW surveillance and tracking.
Even so, those assets continue to be greatly hampered by
lack of cuing information, and quieter Western targets.
Various other authorities cite Soviet naval
operations and construction programs as proof positive that
the Bastion concept is in fact Soviet strategy.
36MccGwire, "Contingency Plans for World War, 11 p. 75.
37M.L. Miller, "Why Is There A Soviet Navy," Armed
Forces Journal International , April 1987, p. 36.
38Moore, Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-87 , p. 556.
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The U.S. Naval Institute has also published numerous
articles endorsing the bastion theory. Three pertinent
excerpts are cited below.
The Soviets have also always envisioned that their
sanctuary based SSBNs would be protected by a portion of
their general purpose naval and land based air forces. 39
From a military prospective, virtually all the following
missions outlined by Defense Minister Yazov promise to
become more complex and expensive in the coming years.
The protection of SSBNs, involves major investments in
antisubmarine warfare systems, including nuclear-powered
attack submarines, advanced sensors, ASW aircraft and
surface ships, and the other surface forces needed to
protect them and the SSBNs themselves. 40
F. BASTION EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS
Analysis of the way in which the Soviet navy deploys and
exercises its units may offer clues to its warfighting
style. Generally speaking, Soviet naval exercises take
place East of 15 degrees longitude and North of 60 degrees
latitude in the Atlantic and West of 160 East Longitude in
the Pacific. 41 This is somewhat analogous to the United
States Navy exercising well East of Hawaii and West of
Bermuda
.
In evaluating the exercises location it seems that sea
denial is what the bulk of the Soviet Navy is appears
39Rivkin, "No More Bastions for the Bear," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings . April 1984, p. 37.
40Richard L. Haver, "Soviet Navy Perspectives," USNI
Proceedings . May 1988, p. 236.
41
"NAT0 Review 1985," Supreme Allied Commander Atlan-
tic, Norfolk Virginia, 1985, pp. 7-9.
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preparing to engage in war time. Sea denial is best
defined as "the converse of sea control, denying your
opponent a limited area for a limited time, while not
actually controlling it yourself." 42 The degree to which
this is of absolute importance is undeterminable. What is
of importance is whether the "standard" ocean areas for
Soviet naval exercises reflect merely a convenient place to
practice, or if they are indicative of planned theaters of
wartime operations.
1. Exercises
In terms of exercises, the Soviet navy has provided
several major demonstrations of their at-sea operations in
recent years. In reviewing SPRING-EX 84 and SUMMER-EX 85,
it appears these evolutions were primarily oriented towards
exercising a sea denial role by the Soviet fleet. 43 Since
repelling U.S. /NATO incursions into the areas adjacent to
the Soviet Union would not only serve to defend Soviet
territory, but also the SSBNs, the further forward these
exercises (operations) take place the more apt they are to
be effective. Tritten is one of those who has pointed out
that protection of the bastion is not necessarily limited to
defensive operations:
42 R. Van Tol, "Soviet Naval Exercises: 1983-85," Naval
Forces , Vol. VII, No. 6, July 1986, p. 29.
43Van Tol, "Soviet Naval Exercises: 1983-85," p. 29.
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Bastion defense may be defensive strategy, but involves
aggressive tactics and offensive operations. Bastions
will not be passively defended. Defense of bastions may
take place in the conventional phase of the armed struggle
even though the primary object of attack by the West and
subject of defense by the Soviet Union are nuclear
forces. 44
Thus while an area defense exercise may appear to be
defense of the bastions by virtue of taking place in a
particular area, Soviet naval exercises need to be evaluated
less for their location, and more for their scope of
operations and degree of coordination between units.
2 . Operations
It is very difficult to define the operational tempo
of the Soviet SSBN fleet. Clearly the Soviets keep a much
smaller percentage of their forces at sea than does the
United States. 45 The Soviets seem to maintain 28 of 62
SSBNs in an alert status vice an advertised over 50% of U.S.
SSBNs. Several reasons are possible for this difference.
First, the Soviets may believe that there is no threat
significant enough on a day-to-day basis to warrant the at
sea capability for an assured countervalue second strike. 46
Second, the Soviets may not be capable of maintaining the
44Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear War , p. 98.
45ADM James D. Watkins, testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee, FY 1986, Part 2, p. 927.
46A number of arguments can be made to support this
assertion. First, the U.S. national character precludes such
an attack, even in the most extraordinary circumstances.
Second, in any plausible scenario, increasing tensions and
mobilizations on both sides would be expected as a precursor
to hostilities by the Soviets and the West.
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SSBN fleet in the high state of material readiness necessary
for units were constantly on patrol. 47 Third, the
Delta/Typhoon boats in port could be considered available
for use, and, if their operating areas are close by, even a
relatively short crisis and tension-building period could
permit a rapid "surge." 48
The concept of maintaining a constantly alert and
fully deployed secure second strike is only reguired if an
attack by a potential opponent is considered within the
realm of reason. For the Soviet Union, with the United
States as the potential assailant, a devastating surprise
attack may be considered a highly improbable occurrence.
This alone would justify having very few units in firing
position or on patrol per se. High readiness to deploy in
case of a crisis may be a sufficient precaution from the
Soviet point of view. 49
The extensive wear and tear on SSBNs constantly on
patrol may exceed the capabilities of Soviet repair
facilities. The Ministry of Shipbuilding is separate from
the Navy and, as throughout Soviet society, it is
preferable to fulfill the central plan by producing new
units rather than maintain old ones. The high demand for
47Bryan Ranft, The Sea in Soviet Strategy . Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1987, p. 170.
48Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare , p. 34.
49Watkins, Congressional Testimony, FY 1986 HAC, p. 928.
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not only uniformed nuclear reactor specialist, but also
repair and rework personnel may be sufficient cause alone to
maintain higher material readiness in port vice running down
complex equipment at sea. 50
This does have its drawbacks however when it comes
to crew proficiency. The lack of practice at operating
could be a major problem, if operating is a major factor in
executing a wartime role. If "operating" consists of
manning what the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence has
referred to as "a missile barge," little at-sea time could
be inconsequential. 51 Admiral James Watkins, former Chief
of Naval Operations had this to say regarding Soviet
submarine crew efficiency:
Soviet crews decry the fact they don't get enough at-sea
training time. They bitch about it in the documents and
we see the results. In the last ten years, they have had
over 2 00 submarine accidents, some of which have been very
serious. They have lost submarines, had fires, had real
problems. 52
The final reason for low SSBN at sea rates may lie
in the fact the Soviets may utilize the SSBNs in port like
floating missile batteries. Not only is the range
sufficient for this purpose, but defense measures are also
being taken to support Soviet SSBN in-port survivability.
This includes the construction of tunnels in which SSBNs can
50Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare , p. 34.
51Haver, "The Soviet Submarine Force," p. 12 6.
52Watkins, Congressional Testimony, FY 1986 HAC, Part
2, p. 928.
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ride out attacks, similar to the submarine pens built by the
Germans in World War II. 53
G. CONCLUSIONS
There is an almost irreconcilable difference between
what the Soviet navy says its primary mission is and what
types of general purposes forces it is building. The
Soviets, having achieved the ability to employ SLBMs from
within their territorial seas, no longer have to contend
with dangerous transits and patrols for strategic forces.
The massive amounts of Soviet literature supporting pro-SSBN
operations, defense of the homeland, and the need to support
submarines cannot be denied. Nor can the large, bluewater
capabilities and efforts of the Soviet Navy.
The type of navy needed to defend the SSBN fleet in
homewaters exists in the Soviet navy today. However, along
with the coastal ASW and robust mining forces at the Navy's
disposal there exists a second Soviet navy.
This second navy, the open ocean blue water portion of
the Soviet fleet, is capable [or is rapidly obtaining the
capability for] of all the things that naval power has
traditionally served. Power projection and more important-
ly, "cruiser warfare" or Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC)
interdiction are now missions the navy can execute in
support of Army operations in the Central Front, Central
53Military Power 1986 , Government Printing Office,
Washington D.C., 1986, p. 21.
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Europe. But these naval tasks can only be carried out if
general purpose forces are re-assigned away from the open
ocean pro-bastion mission. This thesis argues that the
Soviet SSBN fleet can be safely and adequately protected by
the numerous Soviet coastal vessels, in concert with Land
Based Air (LBA) . These forces can, and will protect Soviet
SSBNs in the shallow coastal waters during a conventional
war. The hypothesis to be examined is that, by establishing
the bastions within the claimed territorial waters of the
Soviet Union, minimal force will be required to maintain the
requisite "combat stability" for SSBNs. This type of
bastion, a Close Aboard Bastion defined as in which one
boundary of the bastioned area includes the Soviet landmass,
has available land based tactical air cover, and lies within
Soviet territorial seas. The utilization of CABs to protect
the SSBNs will allow the Soviets to provide maximum leverage
on the most likely theatre of warfare: the Central Front.
The origins of the CAB strategy lie in Soviet thought.
Bradford Dismukes has pointed out that the Soviets have a
proclivity to telegraph their intended operations via
statements regarding the purported goals of the United
States Navy. 54 If this is valid, the repeated discussion of
54 Bradford Dismukes, "Introduction," Soviet and Other
Communist Navies: A View from the Mid 1980s . Willam L.
George ed. , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1985
p. 7.
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U.S. coastal operations for various U.S. SLBM platforms is a
key to Soviet plans for their own SSBN fleet. 55
Writing in the Winter of 1972, Captain First Rank
Yerofeyev pointed out the advantages of a SSBN force
deployed in coastal waters:
The need is removed to employ the highly vulnerable system
of forward basing of SSBNs in England, SpajLn, and the
island of Guam. The disposition of control,
communications and less wear and tear on propulsion
systems and transit times makes this optimal. 56
Further, Captain Yerofeyev pointed out that "since a naval
intercontinental missile has not yet developed," it is
unavoidable for the U.S. to utilize this forward basing
strategy. 57 It was at this time the Delta class and SS-N-8
were being deployed which could take advantage of its
inherent range to operate in Soviet coastal waters.
In the late 1970s as the United States studied various
platforms in an effort to determine the optimum basing mode
for the yet to be developed MX missile, the Soviets took
this occasion to again tout the advantages of a coastal
deployment strategy:
Operating from launch areas near the North American
continent, the minisubs can be screened reliably by the
55Inter alia, Ye. Rakitin, "Trident Is Being Improved,"
Morskoy Sbornik , June 1980, p. 82 and L. Yerofeyev, "Naval
Intercontinental Missiles," Morskoy Sbornik , January 1972,
p. 51.
56Captain First Rank Yerofeyev, "Western SSBNs,"
Morskoy Sbornik , January 1972, p. 51.
57Yerofeyev, "Western SSBNs," p. 51.
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continental antisubmarine defenses and can obtain all
kinds of support. 58
This could be construed a number of ways. First, the
Soviets could be telling their own officers a coastal
strategy was best and it afforded the optimal protection of
SSBNs. Secondly, the Soviets could be pointing out that
they first held the option to execute a coastal strategy
with the long range built into their SS-N-8 system. Lastly,
it could be signalling to the Soviet naval officers that
their strategy was "scientifically" correct, and that the
West was attempting to copy Soviet operations.
Throughout any examination of Soviet SSBN forces it
should be realized that the Soviet Union has said very
little regarding the specific strategies or operating areas
for their SSBN force. It would not be prudent for them to
do so for a number of reasons. The following chapters will
attempt to examine and reconcile the various options and
drawbacks of a CAB strategy for the Soviet Union.
58Ye. Rakitikin, "Trident Is Being Improved," Morskov
Sbornik, June 1980, p. 83.
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III. THE CLOSE ABOARD BASTION CONCEPT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter defines, explores and argues the case for a
Close Aboard Bastion strategy for Soviet SSBNs as a strategy
optimized for a conventional war-fighting environment. In
terms of nuclear war, the utility of the CAB is a function
of the Soviet proclivity to initiate the nuclear exchange.
Namely, were the Soviets to plan for immediate use of
nuclear weapons, it would make little sense to deprive
themselves of a key surprise attack option via the CAB
concept. It will be shown that the Soviets are able to find
merit in the CAB concept in military terms, both tactical
and strategic. In particular, it is argued that the CAB
concept reconciles the apparent paradox between Soviet
defensive force withholding reguirements on the one hand and
the large capable "bluewater" fleet currently operated on
the other.
In discussing the benefits of a CAB strategy it must be
realized that every truly effective strategy is a set of
choices made to optimize the chances of success in a given
environment. In the CAB strategy, the Soviets make a clear
choice as to which type of strategy and environment they are
opting for: fighting a conventional war while holding their
SSBNs in positions which make conventional attack very
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difficult. Further, this frees substantial forces for other
missions, a key factor in conventional warfare.
The military advantages to the Soviet Union in employing
the CAB strategy are many. They fall into two categories:
(1) direct support tactical benefits; and (2) strategic
advantages. In terms of direct support, this category
includes factors which will directly assist in protracted
SSBN survivability, enhance command and control functions,
ease resupply, and simplify defense options. Several
strategic advantages exist for the Soviets. First, the CAB
strategy frees Soviet general purpose forces to execute
"traditional" naval missions, (specifically interdiction of
SLOCs) . Secondly, A CAB posture strengthens the Soviet case
for bartering away SSBNs in a future Strategic Arms Reduc-
tion Talks [START] treaty in place of mobile systems, yet
undermining via treaty the key component in Western
deterrent strength, i.e., the SSBN fleet.
The following sections highlight the various tactical
areas strengthened by a CAB strategy. Included are command,
control and communications, logistics, tactical defense and
resistance to the risk of a Western nuclear barrage.
B. TACTICAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF THE CAB
1. CAB Command and Control
The Soviet SSBN positioned within the territorial
seas of the Soviet Union in a CAB would benefit from
extremely reliable command and control. This command and
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control would include all long range systems, satellites,
high frequency circuits and ultra low frequency (ULF)
transmissions, in addition to line of sight communications.
Since some CAB positions may be thousands of kilometers from
communication nodes, the full range of Soviet communication
capabilities may be utilized if necessary. The addition of
ultra-high frequency (UHF) and very high frequency (VHF)
circuits available for SSBN control is an important addition
to SSBN connectivity.
The Soviets have made several advances in long range
transmission devices, notably a version of the Tu-95, the
Bear J, which mirror-images the U.S. Navy EC-13 0Q TACAMO
capability. 1 While these aircraft could transmit messages
to SSBNs, they could also be utilized to transmit messages
to general purpose Soviet submarines regarding locations of
NATO re-supply convoys. It may be a key mistake to assume a
Tu- 95 Bear J communications aircraft has the same clientele
as does its U.S. counterpart. Tactical submarines can be
served as well by VLF communications as can their strategic
counterparts
.
Soviet plans for employing SSBNs positioned in CABs
would include participation in either a second strike
(countervalue) or as part of a strategic reserve. 2 In
^-Soviet Military Power 1988 , Government Printing
Office, Washington D.C., 1988, p. 48.
2Ranft, The Sea in Soviet Strategy , pp. 168-169.
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either type of use, it is fair to assume major damage may
have been done to the Soviet strategic communications
systems.
In the event a large electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
generating weapon is detonated, high-freguency communica-
tions will be degraded due to changes in the ionosphere
which may last hours. 3 Damage to satellites "could range
from degradation to destruction. Even in event of
catastrophic damage (meaning post counterforce) to the
Soviet C3 architecture, UHF and VHF communications would be
available almost instantly following such destruction. The
time to transmit new targeting packages and execute a second
(or third) strike would be available. In addition, the
ability to verify that the SSBN still existed and was
capable of responding to targeting reguirements, would
greatly aid the generation of follow-on attack planning.
This instantaneous updating of SSBN status and availability
is not obtainable in any other deployment scheme. Table 7
shows some impacts of electro-magnetic pulse on various
communications media. No nation operating SSBNs desires an
extended period of time in which the SSBN is out of communi-
cation with National Command Authority (NCA) . Keeping the
SSBNs on call in a CAB (while maintaining reliable
3Samuel Glasstone, and Philip Dolan, eds., The Effects
of Nuclear Weapons , United States Departments of Defense and




EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR DETONATIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS
Frequency
Band Duration Range
Very Low Frequency Minutes to Hours 1000s km
Low Frequency Minutes to Hours 1000s km
Medium Frequency Minutes to Hours 1000s km
High Frequency Minutes to Hours 1000s km
Very High Frequency Minutes Up to 100s km
Ultra High Frequency Seconds Up to 10s km
Source: Nuclear Weapons and Effects , Samuel Glasstone
ed., United States Department of Defense and
Energy Research and Development Administration,
Washington D.C., 1977, p. 490.
communications) would reduce the ambiguous nature of an SLBM
launched from open ocean. This close control is well within
the conjectured constraints of the Strategic Rocket Force
being closely monitored by the Committee for State Security
(KGB) for weapons release procedures. 4
2 . CAB Resupplv
Logistics support for the SSBN force is of key
import in only two circumstances. First, a situation could
be envisioned where the strategic reserve is held for a
4Coincidentally, the KGB operates its own coastal
navy—in a CAB concept their role with regard to control of
the Strategic Rocket Force could be duplicated in a maritime
fashion. Stephen Meyer, Controlling Nuclear Operations .
(Ashton B. Cartere ed.), Brookings Institute, Washington
D.C. , 1987 p. 492.
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relatively long time during a protracted war. In this case,
rather mundane necessities such as food, spare parts mail,
etc, would need to be delivered to the SSBN in the CAB. In
the second instance, a scenario which involved some nuclear
exchanges, a rather more complex effort to reload (or
replace due to maintenance problem) the SLBMs in the main
battery might be required. In either event, a war of any
length will require that some logistic support will be
necessary.
Re-supply of "housekeeping" requirements can be
accomplished by way of vertical replenishment. This could
also be done via ship, although that would lend itself to
greater risk counterdetection due to the presence of a
supply ship in CAB waters. Since the CAB would be well
within massive fighter cover available from the PVO Strany,
the logistics aircraft would be in no danger. Interestingly
enough, the Soviets continue to operate 90 seaplane
aircraft. 5 The Be-12 Mail could be well suited to
delivering supplies to a coastal SSBN. While not listed as
cargo aircraft, these units could serve a wartime logistics
role.
This replenishment would be an outstanding
opportunity for the Soviet navy to engage in "maskirovka.
"
In deceiving the West about the locations along the Soviet
Understanding Soviet Naval Developments . Department
of the Navy, Washington D.C., 1985, p. 140.
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coastline where the SSBNs were actually positioned, the
Soviets could prepare "ambushes" for forward patrolling
Western SSNs. Helicopters traveling to remote bays and
estuaries and dropping off containers could confuse U.S.
sensors attempting to discover actual SSBN locations.
Similarly, coastal shipping could be employed in deceptive
operations. The degree to which ice-free waters are
available dictates, to some degree,the manner of
replenishment but clearly such logistics support is
accomplished with greater ease than returning SSBNs fiom the
high seas. Such a transit would expose SSBNs to precisely
the type of threat the CAB protects them from.
The Soviet navy has built and deployed a ship which
has the capability to reload SLBMs at sea. The Alexander
Brykin class, of which only one exists, lends further
credibility to a CAB strategy. First, an auxiliary ship
capable of transporting 72 SLBMs to SSBNs transiting through
high seas makes a target that is highly attractive. 6 Loss
of such a ship could prove crippling in terms of losses of
SLBMs.
Secondly, this situation implies that the SSBN being
replenished has depleted its initial load-out in a first
exchange. If so, it seems a fair assumption that United
States Strategic Command, Control, Communication and
Intelligence (C 3 I) capabilities will have been adversely
6Soviet Military Power , pp. 48-49.
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affected by the initial missile exchanges. 7 While strategic
C 3 I assets may have been degraded, certainly some tactical
sensors will remain, and thus a threat would be posed by
Western forces beyond the protection of coastal forces.
It is not a gross assumption to believe that at this
juncture (following an intercontinental exchange) transiting
such a ship through coastal waters could be accomplished in
relative safety. All the advantages in a CAB defense would
benefit the Brykin as it re-supplied various SSBNs in
coastal waters.
Logistics support takes on a whole new meaning when
it is recognized what requirements would exist for a
protracted forward naval defense in depth of the Soviet
Union. Maintaining the forward deployed forces on station
in order to provide defense-in-depth in key areas requires
an underway replenishment capability the Soviets do not
have. The CAB enables the Soviets to defend the SSBNs
without overtasking their limited logistics forces.
C. MECHANICS OF CAB DEFENSES
The defense of the CAB does not require the majority of
the general purpose forces of the Soviet navy. It does
require the Soviet navy execute several missions which are
well within its grasp. The defense of the CAB is a very
7C 3 I facilities which are not attacked in a counter-
force missile exchange may be attacked by Soviet special
forces, spetsnaz.
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simple concept—at least in principle. In relatively
shallow water, mining can be highly effective. Local
landbased air cover can provide defense against a variety of
threats. Coastal ASW patrol craft could defend against
another danger, namely, the intrusion of hostile fast attack
nuclear powered submarines (SSNs) . In addition, such
coastal vessels can provide a powerful anti-surface warfare
(ASUW) capability via their cruise missile batteries. The
types of forces required to execute the CAB strategy are in
the Soviet navy today.
1 . Mine Warfare and the CAB
It is widely acknowledged that the Soviet Union
possesses a huge stockpile of naval mines. 8 Defensive
mining support of a CAB deployment pattern would certainly
require a great many mines; moreover, it would be prudent
for the Soviet planner to prepare more CAB positions than
there are SSBNs. The creation of redundant CAB locations
gives flexibility to SSBN operations, allowing for movement
between bastion positions. Further, this provides, in a way
similar to the "shell game" MX missile basing scheme, a
degree of ambiguity in SSBN location. 9
The geography of the hypothesized CAB locations is
conducive to defensive minelaying. First, the mines may be
8Ranft, The Sea in Soviet Strategy , p. 96.
9This would be a sea-based version of the Multiple
Protective Shelter (MPS) MX missile basing proposal,
colloquially known as the MX "shell game."
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deployed during peace time. Since the mines will be placed
in Soviet internal seas, no international law will have been
breached. 10 Secondly, the areas to be mined are relatively
shallow. The vast majority of sea areas that are candidates
for CAB locations lie well within the two hundred meter
depth range. 11 In this situation the Soviets could employ
both bottom and moored mines, leaving very little room for
an intruder to maneuver in. Lastly, the defensive mining
could be conducted in such a way as to give each SSBN some
degree of maneuver space.
2 . CAB Anti-air Warfare and Western Aviation ASW
Key characteristic of the U.S. and Allied ASW effort
is the high level of integration of air assets. To a large
degree, these aircraft are defenseless. While this does not
preclude their use in a forward hostile environment,
aircraft attrition would be a significant problem. The
ability of these aircraft to search for SSBNs in a CAB,
operating within range of Soviet land-based aviation could
mean unacceptable losses.
10The Soviets, while signatories to the Third United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
,
unilaterally reserve the right to suspend the right of
innocent passage through Soviet territorial waters,
"Territorial Waters of the USSR," Decree No. 384, Council of
Ministers, 28 April, 1983, Article 6.
11The large bodies of open sea claimed by the Soviets
as internal waters includes almost every bay and indentation
on the Soviet coastline, including almost completely the 200
meter isobath. "Limits of the Seas," United States
Department of State, Series, 800491.
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The PVO Strany, the Soviet command tasked with
providing air interceptor defense of the Soviet Union is
largely geared toward intercepting and destroying B-52s at
high subsonic speeds. 12 Despite some well-publicized
shortcomings in Soviet air defenses, not the least, of which
was the arrival of a Cessna 172 in Red Square, PVO Strany
should be more than able to deal with the West's relatively
slow maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) . Currently equipped
with 2,250 fighter-interceptor aircraft, PVO Strany includes
increasing numbers of 11-7 6 MAINSTAY Airborne Warning and
Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft which can provide control
for aircraft not directed by land-based radars in the ground
controlled interceptor role [GCI]. 13
The destruction of aircraft that intrude into CAB
airspace could be accomplished via other means currently in
the Soviet military inventory. Shore-based surface to air
missiles, could eliminate aircraft before an ASW
investigation could even begin. Similarly, some Soviet navy
coastal patrol craft are equipped with air defense weapons,
any of which are capable of destroying ASW aircraft.
The Soviet Union has a large coastal patrol force
capable of minelaying and sweeping, as well as ASW. In
these two roles coastal forces would play a key role in
12Soviet Military Power 1988 . p. 100, and Frank
Carlucci, Annual Report to Congress 1988 . Government
Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1988, pp. 236-237.
13Soviet Military Power 1988 . pp. 81-82.
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defending the CAB. Commenting on the coastal-patrol forces,
James J. Tritten notes that, "Coastal-patrol combatants have
capabilities well out of proportion to their cost or
size." 14 The CAB role is one that can fully exploit those
capabilities. Tritten goes on to add that:
Most of the Soviet Navy's coastal-patrol forces are
oriented toward antisubmarine or anti-surface warfare.
Coastal defense would be performed by more than these
small combatants, however. Onshore missile batteries,
defensive minefields, and supporting airpower can all be
brought to bear on control of the adjacent seas. 15
A review of Soviet coastal craft can provide some insight as
to what missions they may be able to execute. While as
noted below some of these units are be posted to the shallow
water fleets of the Baltic and Black Sea, 430 ships would be
available for CAB defensive duties in the Northern and
Pacific fleets which operate SSBNs. Table 8 cites the 1986
deployment of coastal craft among the various Soviet fleets.
It is instruction to construct a notional CAB defen-
sive flotilla in order to better appreciate the types of
capabilities these small units may bring to bear. Bearing
in mind that each fleet might choose to establish several
"maskirovka" bastions without an SSBN, more "CAB flotillas"
would need to be formed than there are SSGNs/SSBs. Also,
14James Tritten, "Soviet Amphibious, Mine and Coastal
Patrol Forces," Soviet and Other Communist Navies: A View
from the 1980s . William L. George ed. , Naval Institute
Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1985, p. 160.




HOMEPORT BY FLEET OF COASTAL WARFARE VESSELS
Vessel
Type Northern Pacific Black Sea Baltic
Light Forces 25 90 130 115
Mine Warfare 60 90 90 90
Missile Boats 25 45 45 25
Light Frigates 45 50 45 25
Totals 155 275 310 255
Source: Jane 1 s Fi qhtincr Ships. 1986--87, pp. 577--592.
different mixes of CAB flotillas might reflect the specific
defense required of a given area, i.e., heavier emphasis in
ASW versus mine warfare, etc.
First, Table 9 lists the primary "installed" warfare
capabilities of the Soviet navy's coastal defense forces.
Added to the inventory of "active fleet" CAB defen-
sive forces could be substantial numbers of combatants
normally held in reserve. 16
A "notional" coastal flotilla charged in the defense
of a CAB position might include the following:
1. Petya Class Light Frigate: Serving as the flotilla
commander's flagship, the Petya towed sonar would
serve as the outward guard against hostile SSN forces.
16Tritten, "Soviet Amphibious, Mine and Coastal Patrol
Forces," p. 160. Jane's reports about 80 Soviet ships in
reserve which could be utilized for CAB defense. Many of
these are conventionally powered submarines.
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Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-87 . pp. 580-588.
2. Matka Class Missile Hydrofoil: Equipped with SS-N-2
Styx missile system, this unit would be the anti-
surface platform.
3. T-4 3/PGR: The long range air search radar would serve
as organic threat warning and control of CAB air
assets.
4. Nanuchka Class Missile Corvette: The point air
defense capability aboard this unit provides the CAB
force with organic AAW capability, while the long
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range of its anti-surface battery could be useful as
well
.
5. Poti Class Patrol Craft: A final vessel incorporating
both ASW and limited AAW in one hull.
While this sample force does not include logistics ships,
the many auxiliaries and amphibious warfare ships in all
fleets could be pressed into service in this role. The
total number of coastal combatants, 430 (Table 6) could form
86 notional flotillas. This would allow for about 20% of
these ships to be in repair, transit, or in "maskirovka
flotillas" at any given time.
While the smaller coastal vessels may not be
equipped with the most modern or sophisticated sonar
systems, this disadvantage is offset, to a degree, by local
advantages in geography and hydrography. The shallow water
ASW problem, a very difficult tactical situation for both
Soviet and U.S. forces, would greatly work to the Soviets
favor. No doubt, the waters in question would have been
acoustically surveyed and mapped by the Soviet Union. U.S.
SSNs, by contrast, would frequently be ignorant of local
underwater topography and acoustic conditions.
The SSBN will be a difficult target while remaining
submerged and immobile. The most detectable sources for
SSNs searching may be eliminated by operating only those
"hotel" services required to maintain crew habitability and
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weapons systems readiness. 17 In this way even a relatively
noisy SSBN could operate covertly within a CAB.
Finally, shallow water ASW against suspected CAB
locations would entail contending with high levels of
ambient noise. Since many of the CAB positions would be
located within the marginal ice zone, the additional noise
of the grinding and crushing ice would greatly hamper
strategic ASW efforts by the West. Tom Stefanick has
pointed out in his book, Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare
and Naval Strategy , that "there is little prospect of U.S.
area acoustic surveillance of the Soviet marginal seas." 18
Lastly, SSBN noise levels could be "masked" by the
coastal patrol vessels guarding the CAB positions via noise
making decoys or own-ship acoustic signature.
4. CABs and ICBM/SLBM Counterbatterv Fire
A potential CAB defensive drawback is the risk of
preemptive U.S. counterbattery fire by ICBMs, SLBMs or
aircraft delivered nuclear weapons. From the military
standpoint, barraging all known CAB locations with nuclear
weapons does not appear to be a practical Western option.
The reason for this appraisal is the following: first, the
target set of 62 SSBNs would presumably be distributed along
17Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare , p. 266
18Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare , p. 43.
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the 25,000 miles of Soviet coastline. 19 This means the that
the total target area amounts to:
[25,000nm x 12nm (territorial seas)] = 300,000nm2 .
Weapons requirements to saturate 300,000 nm2 can be
calculated using Tom Stefanick's model: 20
(1) pi (4nm) 2 = 51nm2 Targets within this radius are
subject to 590psi overpressure and
can be assumed to be eliminated. 21
In order to barrage the entire area encompassing the CABs,
the following calculation determines the requisite number of
one megaton warheads required to deliver the effects
outlined above:
(2) 3 00, 000nm2/51nm2 = number of aimpoints for one megaton
weapon
5,883 aimpoints > 5,883 x 1.35 [correction for
targeting error
etc. 22 ]
19Clearly, there are areas which could not be utilized
as CAB positions, but equally clearly the U.S. would not be
willing to use its entire nuclear arsenal to execute this
strategy.
20Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare , p. 37.
21Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare , p. 37.
22 According to Stefanick's calculations, an
overpressure of 590 psi (pounds per square inch) is required
for a very high probability of inflicting fatal damage to a
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= 7,942 Equivalent Megatons Required
(EMT23 )
Barrage of this scope would consume the entire EMT
reportedly available in the U.S. strategic arsenal yet still
leave considerable shortages (see Table 10)
.
Weapon




UNITED STATES ANTI-SSBN BARRAGE ASSETS
Total
Available EMT Notes
900 MT Assumes 2 MT warhead
115.7 MT 3 RVs 170 Kiloton
301.5 MT 3 RVs 335 Kiloton
Peacemaker (MX) 23 109.3 MT
Poseidon C-3 256 102.4 MT
Trident C-4 284 307.2 MT
Totals 1,670 1,820 EMT
10 RVs 475 Kiloton
10 RVs 4 Kiloton
8 RVs 100 Kiloton
Source: The Military Balance. 1987-1988 . IISS, p. 202
submarine, if a submarine is exposed to 590 psi at a
distance of four nm from a 1 megaton underwater burst.
Hence the theoretical submarine "kill radius" for a 1
megaton explosion is: pi [4nm] 2 = 51nm2
23Equivalent Megatons, the total amount of explosive
power of a given nuclear weapon or group of nuclear weapons
expressed in millions of tons of TNT.
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Even this staggering amount of EMT massed by the
United States is inadeguate to the task. Certain tightening
of area of probabilities (AOP) for the CAB would impact the
necessary number of one megaton aim points. For instance,
if the United States could locate with a high degree of
confidence the Soviet SSBN fleet, then the reguisite weapons
reguirements would decrease. Assuming suitable areas for a
CAB were limited to perhaps only 2 00 sites, with an average
radius of 2 0nm, then the number of weapons reguired changes
as follows:
200 x pi (20nm) 2 = 80,000nm2 (total area to be
barraged)
80, 000nm2/51nm2 = 1,569 aimpoints
1,569 X 1.35 = 2,118 EMT
This smaller number of nuclear weapons does not take into
account the degradation of nominal weapons effectiveness in
shallow water. Generally speaking, degradation of the
underwater burst is a function of water depth and bottom
type. 24
Clearly, even assuming a "best case" scenario in
which the United States would know with certainty that the
bombardment of 2 00 targets would very probably result in the
destruction of the entire Soviet SSBN fleet, the reguirement
24Nuclear Weapons and Effects , p. 273.
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for 2,118 EMT is clearly beyond current or projected U.S.
strategic force capabilities. Basically, the pay-off would
not be worth the cost, would consume forces that are not
replaceable in wartime, and reduce the U.S. strategic triad
to the Strategic Air Command [SAC] bomber force. 25 By
contrast, the Soviets would still retain their land-based
mobile forces, silo-based ICBMs, and bomber force, and, as a
result, an important strategic advantage.
D. STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES OF THE CAB
The possible strategic advantages of a CAB SSBN
deployment scheme for the Soviet Union are threefold:
1. It would permit the release of large numbers of Soviet
navy general purpose forces for the prosecution of




In the event the United States contemplated nuclear
counterforce options, the CAB scheme would complicate
coordination of targeting; and
3. In fighting a conventional war in which the Soviets
had some limited goals (among which was the avoidance
of an intercontinental exchange}, placing the SSBN
fleet in CABs could be construed as a signal of their
intent to avoid use of nuclear weapons. Those
possible benefits are discussed next.
25Intentionally deleted from these computations for
simplicity's sake. While the B-l, B-52 and FB-111 all could
deliver large yield gravity bombs on CAB positions, they
would be subject to attrition etc., enroute to the CABs.
Further, TLAM/N warheads of 2 00 kilotons would have an
extremely short lethal radius, ruling out there use in this
role.
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1. The Conventional War Advantage
The Soviet navy doctrine for wartime operations is
an integral part of Soviet unified doctrine. Officially,
Soviet navy spokesman do not recognize unique "laws" of
armed conflict at sea . Instead:
Victory is achieved by the coordinated efforts, and this
gives rise to the necessity of integrating all knowledge
about warfare in the frame work and limits of a single
unified military science. 26
As an integrated component of Soviet military power, the
navy will presumably be employed to meet total national
wartime, be it in a nuclear or in a conventional war.
Most contemporary Western analysts of Soviet military
affairs are agreed that current (1980s) Soviet military
planning stresses the priority of conventional war-fighting.
According to James M. McConnell:
...since the spring of 1981, it looks like achieving an
independent conventional option as the basic option—not
the only option, but the basic option—has been set as an
objective of the 1981-1985 plan going on right now. 27
Foremost in Soviet conventional war planning is
presumably the European Front. In the event of war in
Central Europe, NATO will be burdened with the defense of
the trans-Atlantic sealines of communications [SLOCs]
.
No
26FADM Chernavin, Morskov Sbornik , January 1982, p. 20
[as translated by Defense Technical Information Center].
27J.M., McConnell, CNA Report No. 82-1885, "Evidence of
A Higher Priority for the Soviets in an Anti-SLOC Campaign,"
Alexandria, Virginia, 1982 p. 1.
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doubt, Soviet military planners are fully aware of their
potential opponent's logistical weak link.
In the early 1980s the Soviet Union began to review
the importance of a potential campaign to interdict the
SLOCs resupplying NATO. 28 According to one of the most
prominent Western interpreters of Soviet military
pronouncements, James M. McConnell, this recent Soviet
literary concern with the West's dependence on the trans-
Atlantic SLOC, is evidence that SLOCS are of new importance.
McConnell quotes G.M. Sturua, a frequent Soviet commentator
on Western security affairs, in his article "The U.S.
Reliance on an Oceanic Strategy?" in 1982:
The first convoys of transports with reinforcements and
supplies for NATO's joint ground forces would start to
arrive in Europe no earlier than three weeks after the
possible initiation of combat action, with losses from the
combat organized by an opponent possibly amounting even in
the first stage to 50-70% of all the freight hauled. 29
The CAB concept, as envisaged in this paper, would
serve to make available—with no or little loss of SSBN
security
—
precisely the numbers and kinds of naval forces
that might just succeed where the German U-boats of World
War I and II did not. The current [1988] U.S. Navy
intelligence estimate of Soviet bastion strategy holds that
28McConnell, "Evidence of A Higher Priority for the
Soviets in an Anti-SLOC Campaign," p. 1.
29G.M. Sturua, "The U.S. Reliance on an Oceanic
Strategy," Morskov Sbornik . March 1981, p. 102, as cited by
McConnell, "Evidence of A Higher Priority for the Soviets in
an Anti-SLOC Campaign," p. 5.
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only 25 percent of Soviet Northern fleet general purpose
submarines forces will be committed to other than pro-SSBN
duties. 30 If the Soviets are serious about protracted
conventional war planning and, as a corollary, a sustained
anti-SLOC campaign, then they must clearly find a less asset
intensive alternative to the bastion scheme that has
presumably been in effect for the past 15 years or so. The
CAB concept offers such an alternative.
2 . Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties and the CAB
As the Soviet Union and the United States appear
embarked on a new era of strategic weapons systems
[including SSBNs] "build-down," the role of strategic
reserve forces becomes more important. The importance of a
secure and flexible second strike capability is such that
diversification of the second strike and strategic reserve
will be a key element in a future strategic weapons
reduction treaty. The need to hedge against a technological
breakthrough against any one leg of the intercontinental
delivery systems will encourage new basing modes (rail
mobile etc.). The implications for the CAB concept are
several. First, as the absolute number of SSBNs decreases,
individual units will become more important. Lastly,
because a START treaty [by definition] would entail reduced
numbers of nuclear weapons for an area barrage, the area
30RADM Studeman, Testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee, Washington D.C., March, 1988.
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barrage option would lose whatever attractiveness it might
have under conditions of "nuclear plenty."
The currently SALT mandated-limit of 62 modern SSBNs
for the Soviet Union, and 41 for the United States will be
the "starting line up" for START-negotiated SSBN/SLBM
reductions. Since there are sub-limits in terms of
launchers (strategic nuclear delivery vehicles/SNVDs) a
further reduction in hulls authorized would be an area in
which both sides may be amenable to new, lower limits. With
current proposals allowing for 4,900 warheads on ballistic
missiles, and maintaining the current Soviet 2:1 land versus
sea basing modes, the Soviets SSBN force could be drastical-
ly reduced. 31 For the Soviets, an all-Typhoon force of
perhaps eight hulls would be mandated to remain within
proposed limits. 32 Hiding eight SSBNs within the confines
of the territorial seas of the Soviet Union is an easier
task than secreting 62. In any case, the particular
benefits for the CAB strategy are at least twofold; first
each SSBN will have the benefit of a proportionately larger
number of coastal defense assets. Secondly, there will be
greater resources allocated to conventional warfighting
general purpose forces. Of course there are interactive
31
"Strategic Arms Reduction Talks," U.S. Senate
Republican Policy Committee, William Armstrong, Chairman,
June 29, 1988, p. 5.
32Norman Polmar, "Missile Agreements," Proceedings ,
USNI, February 1988, p. 117.
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permutations of these benefits. A greater number of "false"
CABs could be prepared, more could be spent on other types
of maskirovka etc.
In terms of contributing to general purpose forces,
it may be well assumed that a START treaty will reduce
"strategic" weapons, and proliferate "tactical" ones.
Converted SSBNs may carry cruise missiles which may not be
covered under the treaty. 33 In addition, the CAB concept
may offer refuge to ex-SSBN cruise missile submarines
[SSGNs] if they were to form part of the strategic reserve.
They, too, could be afforded protection inside of the CAB,
and could be counted as a secure reserve.
The net impact of any START treaty on the CAB may be
to enhance its utility to the Soviet Navy in conventional
warfighting terms.
3 . Strategic Reserves: A Dynamic Format
The Soviet Union and the United States have long
considered land mobile ICBM basing. 34 The degree to which a
nation now relies on mobile systems is presumably indicative
in part of its faith in the relative security of its
seagoing nuclear forces. The Soviets with their currently
deployed SS-24 rail-mobile ICBM have the lead in this area.
33Watkins, Congressional Testimony, FY 1986 HAC, Part
2, p. 103.
34 In the Eisenhower administration a Minuteman train
mobile system similar to the MX train mobile scheme was
planned with 50 trains. The Kennedy administration
cancelled the program.
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In addition the SS-25 road-mobile ICBM allows for increased
survival from a counterforce strike via dispersion. 35 While
only 100 SS-25s are currently operational, targeting these
units is among the most difficult of all C 3 I problems. 36
The key to a strategic reserve is survivability, not
only of the weapons systems, but also of the reguisite
command and control architecture to enable a second strike.
The 1988 version of Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of
the Threat , points out that the trend is for a smaller
percentage of Soviet total intercontinental capable warheads
to be deployed in a ground encased silo or SSBNs. 37 This
does not differentiate between force allocations in terms of
strategic reserve et al., however, this shift towards
survivable systems apart from seabased systems has been
noted by Western analysts. MccGwire points out that:
Had it not been for the USSR's development of mobile
missiles, the increasing accuracy of U.S. ballistic and
cruise missiles might have brought a greater Soviet
emphasis on sea based ballistic and cruise missiles. As it
is however, the lesser vulnerability and costs of mobile
missiles make it unlikely that the USSR will follow the
U.S. policy of placing an ever greater share of its
strategic missiles on seagoing platforms. 38
It would seem that the Soviet Union, as is the
United States, is concerned lest it place too great a burden
35Soviet Military Power , pp. 29, 47.
36 IISS, p. 206.
37 IISS, p. 206.
38MccGwire, "Contingency Plans for World War," p. 33.
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on any given ICBM/SLBM delivery system. This again works to
support a CAB strategy. The Soviets prefer survivable
systems, capable of a prompt hard target kills: not those
necessarily "wet" or dry. A combination of different
survivability schemes complicates counterforce targeting
problem for the United States.
Table 11 indicates the relative shift of basing
platforms within the Soviet arsenal and the projection for
the next decade.
TABLE 11






•£«imaies based on current i rends
SLBMs
Mid-1990s*
Source: Soviet Military Power, 1988 , p. 46.
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4.
Historical Factors for the CAB
The Soviet navy may have suffered from an inglorious
historical naval tradition due to its exploits in the Second
World War. This however is not due to their fine record in
coastal operations. 39 The Soviets fought well in defense
roles along their own coasts. While this may be the weakest
argument in support of the CAB, the direct defense of the
Soviet Union and its territorial waters is not a task to be
taken lightly by the Soviet navy.
5. Summary
Advantages accrue to the CAB when the relative
merits are reviewed in conventional warfighting logic. The
ability of the Soviet navy to generate forces on "the
cheap" for both bastion defense and more traditional naval
missions is the central advantage in terms of military
gains. The next chapter reviews Legal and Political factors
regarding the CAB strategy.
39Friedreich Ruge, The Soviets As Naval Opponents ,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1979, p. 191.
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IV. LEGAL AND POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS TO THE CAB CONCEPT
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this section is to explore the legal and
political factors that may have entered—indeed may have
encouraged—the postulated Soviet CAB decision. Examined is
the proposition of an extremely "practical" linkage between
Soviet efforts in recent years toward international adoption
of a 12 mile territorial sea regime, and the timing and
intention to deploy the Delta class SSBN force capable of
executing a Close Aboard Bastion strategy. The basic
premise is that the sovereignty over a greater portion of
Soviet coastal seas has important implications for the
Soviet Union's wartime strategic ASW. Additionally, the
political ramifications of striking Soviet territory in an
effort to eliminate strategic nuclear forces is entering a
realm of the unknown and unknowable. In political terms
incursion into the Soviet Union's homewaters will be
examined to determine to what degree the Soviets regard
their territorial seas as inviolate in warfighting
escalation. The political and legal issues regarding the
CAB are further complicated by the integrity of Soviet
waters in peacetime, weapons basing and the Soviet efforts
to establish "ASW-free zones" in order to protect their SSBN
force. In concert, these factors make analysis of Soviet
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coastal claims and intentions difficult to examine in this
regard.
B. THE LAW OF THE SEA AND SOVIET NAVAL POLICY
The original premise for the Third United Nations Law of
the Sea Convention (UNCLOS III 1983) was to codify and
standardize the various national claims regarding
territorial seas. 1 While some coastal states had advanced
claims of 200 nautical miles, others claimed only three
nautical miles. Both the United States and the Soviet Union
were willing to accept a 12 nautical mile statute, in
addition to other guarantees of freedom of navigation, in
order to standardize the recognized coastal territorial
seas. The original cooperation between the two principals
(the United States and the Soviet Union) ended with the
politicization of UNCLOS III. The degeneration of UNCLOS
III into a propaganda debate centered on the sharing of deep
sea bed mining among all nations as a "common heritage of
mankind." However, the ultimate recognition of the key
navigation issues became belatedly accepted as customary
law. 2
l-Burdick Brittin, International Law for Seagoing
Officers , Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1986,
p. 81.
2 Brittin, International Law for Seagoing Officers , p.
11. Customary law is defined as "where by dint of usage, the
custom was recognized by states as an obligation instead of
a matter of voluntary compliance." The key navigation
issues were, straights passage, innocent passage of
warships, standard limits to territorial seas and
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The following review of UNCLOS III highlights the Soviet
position on navigation issues, and postulates a close
relationship between the Soviet view on the scope of
"territorial" sea rights, and the practicality of a CAB SSBN
deployment scheme.
1. Background on the Soviet Position
An advantage of the Soviet system is its ability to
coordinate within its integrated foreign and military policy
all the key adjuncts to support its goals. Among these
important collateral issues was the problem of territorial
seas. In 1966 the Soviet Union had tabled a resolution in
the United Nations calling for a review of key issues left
unresolved by the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference. 3 This was
viewed favorably by the other major maritime powers, notably
the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and France.
For the United States and the Soviet Union, a central
concern was the freedom of movement of naval forces. In the
case of the Soviets, generally conceded to own an adverse
geographical position, the importance of freedom of
navigation via international straights and the establishment
of an internationally agreed 12 nautical mile zone of
territorial seas were priorities which reguired internation-
al codification.
archipelagic passage amongst island states.
3Mark W. Janis, et al., Soviet Ocean Development .
National Ocean Policy Study for the Committee on Commerce,
Washington D.C., October, 1976, p. 288.
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Essentially, the Soviet goal was threefold: first,
the Soviets desired a 12 mile territorial sea. Secondly,
they were concerned about the maintenance of freedom of
passage through the straits of the world, critical to
projecting naval forces out into the open ocean. Lastly,
the Soviets were anxious to have their ambiguous definition
of "historic waters" recognized. The Soviet definition of
"historic waters" is significant because its international
recognition would vastly expand the sea areas "legally"
available to the Soviet Union for implementation of a CAB
posture. 4
These three wishes were advanced in 1977 by Colonel
of Justice Tarkhanov writing in the Soviet journal Morskoy
Sbornik ;
1. Creation of a favorable legal regime of maritime
expanses for the Navy.
2
.
Improvement of rules of relationships among navies of
different states.
3. Development of measures to adopt in naval practice the
requirements, principles, and norms of international
maritime law. 5
While studies have shown inconsistencies in the
Soviet position regarding the locale and extent of their
4The Soviet definition of historical waters are those
bodies of waters "used primarily by one state over a length
of time." In general this has meant that historical waters
can be defined as anyplace the Soviets don't want you to go.
This is adequately ambiguous to allow for latitude in
claiming those seas which Soviets feel are of import. V.
Mamchits and Y. Markov, "Legal Regime of International
Straits," Morskoy Sbornik
. November 1975, p. 74.
5 I. Tarkhanov, "International Maritime Law and the
Navy," Morskoy Sbornik . January 1977, p. 82.
63
claims for historic territorial seas, any such claim, in
particular to the Arctic coast, would greatly expand the
possible areas for a CAB strategy. 6
Several ancillary issues were connected with these
three primary interests, including the delineation of
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) rights and responsibilities,
and the requirement that deep sea mining technology be
shared by all states. Nevertheless the primary interest of
the Soviets, was to secure freedom of navigation for naval
forces. The Soviet literature during the course of UNCLOS
III negotiations discussed items such as Arctic passage, but
the focal point throughout remained making a statement in
support of these three primary Soviet goals. 7
The timing of the Soviet drive for codification of
the twelve nautical mile sea and the development of the
Delta class SSBN cannot be ignored. This evidence,
although circumstantial in nature, shows the drive to obtain
a twelve mile sea coincided with the plans to construct a
withholding force of SSBNs. The initiation of the actual
conference to review the Law of the Sea [LOS], coincidental
with the Delta/SS-N-8, could have well been part of a plan
6Lewis M. Alexander, "Navigational Restrictions Within
the New LOS Context," Offshore Consultants Inc., Peace Shore
Rhode Island, December 1986, Defense Supply Contract No.
MDA-903-84-C-0276
.
7W.E. Butler, "Innocent Passage and the 1982 Conven-
tion: The Influence of Soviet Law and Policy,", pp. 336-7.
Butler discusses the key military applications of the LOS,
notably territorial seas and passage of warships.
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to ensure the Soviet Union has a secure strategic reserve
within the borders of Soviet territory. While linkage of
this type is difficult to prove conclusively, it can be
considered in the broader context of the entire Soviet
strategic approach regarding military operations. If the
decision to build the Delta class submarine prompted an
effort to provide greater territorial seas for it to operate
in, it would have made good sense for the Soviet Union to
seek the appropriate and "legal" international environment
in advance. The reality of Western ASW superiority may have
convinced the Soviets that by utilizing a CAB scheme, the
West would have to conduct strategic ASW offensive opera-
tions in what amounted to Soviet soil. This would be
something that would work for the survivability of SSBNs,
given that their would be political sensitivity to such
"homeland" strikes.
2 . Territorial Seas
The Soviet claim on a 12 nautical mile territorial
sea has rested on three arguments: first the Soviets have
claimed historical precedent based on Soviet law from the
1920s. 8 Secondly, the Soviets have cited the International
Law Commission as having "recognized and firmly
8United States Department of State, Limits of the Seas ,
pp. 21-433. A Decree dated June 27, 1921 claims a 12
nautical mile limit for all Soviet coastal boundaries.
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establishing" the 12 mile limit. 9 Thirdly , they have
argued that extension of the territorial seas to 12 nautical
miles no more than recognizes progress in technological
means for fuller exploitation of offshore waters. According
to one Soviet commentator:
...the question of the breadth of the territorial sea,
still on the agenda of international conferences on
maritime law, should be resolved taking technological
progress into account. .. limits should conform to the
present level of development of science and technology. 10
In exploring the relationship between the
territorial sea and the CAB strategy only the issues
regarding the integrity and breadth of Soviet claimed seas
are germane. In examining these issues, the measurement of
the territorial sea is crucial, as is Soviet declatory
policy regarding the sovereignty issues.
Since the territorial sea is measured from a
baseline seaward as delineated by the coastal state, the
definition of this baseline is critical to the delineation
of the areas encompassed by the Soviet territorial seas and
internal waters.
9 Brittin, International Law for Seagoing Officers , p.
77. The International Law Commission is quoted as: "The
commission does not recognize an extension of the
territorial sea beyond 12 nautical miles."
10Barabolya Ivanschenko et al., Ocean. Technology. Law.
NTIS 1975, translated from original text published in 1972
Moscow Press, p. 54. This might include technical ability
to monitor these seas as well as exploit their natural
resources.
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The baseline issue closely tracked by the Soviets
throughout all the Law of the Sea Treaties. In the book,
Ocean, Technology and Lav , the authors acknowledged that the
"question of the length of the baseline provoked sharp
discussion and was not resolved at the 1958 Convention". 11
The UNCLOS III determination regarding the baseline
issue was ambiguous. It stated that the coastal states were
required to see to it that:
The drawing of a straight baseline must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the
coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be
subject to the regime of internal waters. 12
The Soviet baseline, as declared in Decree Number
4450, dated 15 January 1985, which outlined the ocean
borders of the Soviet Union is, a "straight baseline"
border. 13 It is in direct contradiction with the spirit and
letter of the UNCLOS III treaty. For instance, the baseline
drawn across Peter the Great Bay, home of Vladivostok Naval
base, is 112 nautical miles. It covers a shoreline that is
11Baraboyla, Ocean, Technology, and Law , p. 55.
12United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part
II Section 1, Article 7.3, 10 December, 1982.
13 Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Decree
Number 4450, 15 January, 1985, p. 435. A "straight
baseline" coastal border is defined as one in which the
irregularities of the coastline are ignored and points most
seaward are connected by straight lines to form the
baselines from which territorial seas are measured.
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both sinuous and irregular. 14 Petropavlosk is equally well
"protected" by improperly drawn baseline as depicted in
Figure 1.
On the Northeast Passage, several baselines are
drawn to "close" various straits, notably Vil'Kitsgo and
Dimitriya Lapteva. 15 While the Soviets point out that other
states utilize greater baseline extensions, Denmark and
Iceland with 80 and 90 nautical miles respectively, the
Soviet practice clearly is used to manipulate various
freedoms of navigation, and, arguably to expand the waters
available for CAB deployment.
Within the confines of the proclaimed Soviet
territorial seas lies the Northeast Passage; it has
effectively been closed by the Soviet use of the baseline.
The proclaimed territorial seas, combined with extensive
year round ice, preclude passage by any surface ship without
Soviet permission.
The Soviets, having decreed the extent of their
territorial seas, have a variety of legal to references to
show compliance with both customary law and international
conventions. Again Admiral Nazarenko spelled out this
connection in 1983:
14This is also claimed as "Historic waters," covered
separately.
15The Northeast Passage provides transit from the North
Sea in European Soviet Union to the Chukchi Sea south to the
Pacific Ocean and the Far Eastern Regions of the Soviet Union.
68
-t- - I T T l i l
Internal Waters
KAMCHAT
PEN J N SU
Source: "Limits of the Seas," No. 107, United
States Department of State, 1987.
Figure 1. Soviet Internal Waters
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This document (1983 Supreme Soviet Decree} reflected
generally recognized principles and standards of
contemporary international maritime law, secured in the
1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention signed by the Soviet
Union on 10 December, 1982. 16
This leads to the conclusion that the Soviet Union claims a
12 mile limit, and that it considered this feature a
"recognized principle," hence customary law. Such
recognition is critical in determining what " rights and
recognitions other countries render the Soviet Union in
terms of honoring territorial waters.
The breadth of the territorial sea was another issue
that received great Soviet attention at both the Geneva and
Jamaica conventions. The International Law Commission, the
Soviets report, was of the opinion that "international law
does not permit extension of the territorial sea beyond the
twelve mile limit." 17
In summary, it would appear that the Soviet Union
fully intends to maintain a twelve mile territorial sea. In
198 Major General of Jurisprudence P. Barabolya, the deputy
of the Soviet delegation to UNCLOS III, wrote that;
this draft [UNCLOS III] contains such extremely important
questions of territorial waters. . .general agreement of all
states has almost been reached with respect to 90% of the
16Nazarenko, "Legal Regime of Coastal Maritime Waters
in the Law on the USSR State Border", Morskov Sbornik , July
1983, p. 95.
17United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Official Records, Appendix Vol. Ill, p. 209 [taken from
Baraboyla, p. 56].
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provisions .. .the 12 mile limit, and the regime of
territorial waters. 18
3 . Historic Waters
The issue of historic waters is one in which the
difficulty of determining sovereignty becomes apparent. In
buttressing their claims on various "historic" waters,
Soviet writers frequently cite their historical control as
precedent. "Precedent" is sufficiently ambiguous, however,
for the Soviets to claim bodies of water that wash onto the
shores of other states. 19
A related Soviet claim concerns the concept of
"closed seas." A closed sea is a body of water in which
only states that border on it may navigate upon it. 20 The
Baltic Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Black Sea, and the Sea
of Japan have all been cited as candidates for "closed
seas." Since the concept behind closing these bodies of
water is based on historical precedent (and a claim to
"internal waters" as defined by Soviet law) , the degree to
which freedom of navigation is allowed is important. 21
18Barabolya, Ocean, Technology and Law , April 1980, p.
70.
19The Sea of Okhotsk is often mentioned as "historic
waters," despite periods of Japanese control, and occupation
of Sakahalin Island.
20Alexander, "Navigational Restrictions Within the New
LOS Context," p. 67.
21D.W. Given, "The Sea of Okhotsk: The USSR's Great
Lake?", Proceedings
. September, 1970, pp. 48-49.
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The distinction between historic and closed waters
is difficult, but both incorporate the exclusion of non-
Soviet vessels from operating in or transiting through these
areas. The Soviets recognize that historic waters are
difficult to define. According to Baraboyla in 1972 "until
recently it has not been possible to develop either in the
theory or practice of international relations, a clear-cut
conception of 'historic waters* and 'historic bays'." 22
Today still, a workable and agreed upon definition escapes
international jurists. It is the Soviet contention:
In the doctrine as well as the practice of international
law, it is recognized that States may, under certain
circumstances, for historic reasons extend their
sovereignty to certain waters which adjoin their
seacoast. 23
To the Soviets credit, they are cognizant of the
problems in defining these "certain circumstances"; with the
exception of what are internationally accepted as "historic
bays," the Soviets seem to define historic waters merely as
bodies of water they would prefer to keep non-Soviets out
of. It is not surprising that Soviets have security
concerns in the Kara and White Seas, claimed as historic
waters, as well as in the Sea of Okhotsk.
While carrying out a CAB strategy, the Soviet Navy
would pursue every pre-hostility course of action to secure
22Baraboyla, Ocean. Technology and Law , p. 45
23Baraboyla, Ocean. Technology and Law , p. 47
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their ballistic missile submarines in transit to these
waters. Any pretense, however vague or ill-claimed, would
be marshalled to try and keep potential foes out of
sensitive security areas, and justify action against Western
ASW units attempting to trail or otherwise localize Soviet
SSBNs. The 1972 book, Ocean Technology and Law , closes its
discussion of historic waters with the assertion that;
Thus, despite distinct differences of opinion, the status
of historic waters has much in common and is established,
and even now permits us to pose the question of
standardization of the concept of "historic waters" in the
interests of peace and the security of peoples. 24
Writing in July of 1983 Admiral Nazarenko pointed
out that the use of force to eliminate naval violators is
both justified and can be expected. The fact that the
Soviets feel such incursions are occurring in peacetime is
apparent when Nazarenko states:
Violators of the USSR state border include foreign
submarines. .. such actions are crude violations of the
USSR's sovereignty and contradict generally recognized
standards of conduct under international law. 25
Whether or not there are submarines violating Soviet waters
is not the question; what is significant is that the Soviets
regard maritime boundaries as sacrosanct in time of peace
and war. Only grudgingly do the Soviets accept that
warships may transit their waters under innocent passage, a
transit which must be in accordance with Soviet
24Baraboyla, Ocean Technology and Law , p. 53.
25Nazarenko, Morskoy Sbornik , July 1983, p. 99.
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instructions, in clear defiance of international
convention. 26
C. POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF A CAB STRATEGY
Potential political advantages of a CAB strategy for the
Soviet Union are several. Political advantages may be
defined as those which further the interest of the Soviet
Union in peacetime, or provide wartime advantage without
military operations. These advantages include declaring
unilateral ASW free zones in coastal areas, a posture which
eliminates Soviet, [but not U.S.] SSBNs from the open ocean.
This would provide the Soviet with an propaganda coup by
being able to claim that no Soviet strategic nuclear weapons
were deployed on submarines on the high seas. Also, while
not exclusive to the CAB strategy, a decreasing dependence
on Soviet SSBNs as a part of their nuclear forces (assuming
the current shift to mobile ICBMs continues) allows for the
Soviets to consider the SSBN fleet available for START
treaty reduction. Alone, none of these advantages may seem
significant, however, in aggregate, they add compelling
weight to the case for the CAB strategy.
26The USS Yorktown and USS Caron foray into the Black
Sea and the resultant ramming by the Soviet navy is
indicative of Soviet dis-respect for freedom of passage. See
W.E. Butler, "Innocent Passage and The 1982 Convention, The
Influence of Soviet Law and Policy," The American Journal of
International Law . April 1987, pp. 333-334, and Phillip
Taubman, "Soviets Hope Provocation At Sea Won't Hurt Talks,"
New York Times February 14, p. 1
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1. ASW Free Zones
Arms Control treaties seem to take one of two
general directions. First, they either limit the number and
types of weapons deployed, or secondly they put limitations
on where and how the weapons may be used. 27 In the case of
the postulated CAB strategy both dimensions of the arms
control equation come into play.
Threatening the opponent's SSBNs with destruction is
perceived, by some observers, as "de-stabilizing" and as
risking unwanted escalation of (conventional) hostilities to
the nuclear level. In order to minimize this danger, the
creation of "ASW Free Zones" has been proposed. Broadly
speaking, such zones would entail the exclusion of opposing
ASW capabilities, from sea areas set aside as SSBN "sanctu-
aries." This is the essence of the second element of arms
control: weapons systems location.
The establishment of mutually-agreed ASW Free Zones
would be extremely beneficial for the Soviet Union. First,
the Soviets would have a good idea where the West's SSBNs
are located, an advantage they currently do not have. 28
Secondly, Soviet general purpose forces would be freed
entirely from the burden of providing "combat support" for
their SSBN force. Lastly, the Soviets could economize on
27George Quester, Praeger Press, New York, NY, 1983, p.
38.
28This makes the assumption that the West would place
them in these zones, not necessarily a valid assumption.
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their ASW forces, and capitalize on other naval mission
areas.
By adopting a CAB SSBN deployment strategy, the
Soviets are able to take advantage of only one of these key
advantages. The SSBNs would be located inside territorial
waters, largely in Soviet internal waters. This is an
important distinction. As James Tritten has noted:
Another Soviet option is to deploy submarines in
restricted waters, so for geographic, military, political
and legal reasons, other nations would find it more
difficult to conduct offensive antisubmarine warfare
operations. 29
Attacking an SSBN which is positioned in internal or
territorial waters is a different proposition than attacking
one on the high seas. The difference is analogous to the
perceived threshold that separates a NATO decision to attack
Soviet second echelon forces marshalling in Eastern Europe,
from one to strike these same forces within the Soviet Union
proper. From a practical military point of view, the
decision whether to prosecute Soviet SSBNs on the high seas
or in Soviet internal waters may seem artificial; the
symbolic difference may be one that matters however.
The CAB strategy would be, in effect, a unilateral
declaration of an ASW free zone inside Soviet coastal
waters. This does not necessarily guarantee against attack
by Western forces. It certainly complicates it tactically
29James J. Tritten, "Scenarios of Nuclear Escalation
Dominance and Vulnerability", Naval PostGraduate School
Technical Report NPS-56-88-013 June 1988, p. 19.
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as mentioned in Chapter III, but it also sends a political
message regarding the inviolability of attacking strategic
assets in the Soviet homeland. This may telegraph the
degree to which the combatants are willing to go for
favorable war termination. 30 Homeland attacks against
portions of the Soviet strategic reserve are a clear message
that the West is attempting to alter the nuclear correlation
of forces. The additional protection this affords the
Soviet SSBN fleet is an advantage easily won merely by
locating the SSBNs where they will be less vulnerable and
more easily controlled.
2 . SSBN Force Level Reductions and the CAB Strategy
Since there is a finite amount of coastline in which
to hide the Soviet SSBN force, a reduced number of SSBNs
increases both the difficulty, and the payoff to the
attacker of detection. On balance, however, fewer SSBNs
strengthen the advantage of the CAB strategy. Those
advantages are threefold: First, having to conceal fewer
SSBNs means that more vacant CAB positions can be used to
try and lure Western naval forces into ambush. Secondly, as
a shift from sea-based nuclear reserve forces to land-based
assets (road and rail mobile SS-24s and SS-25s) occurs, the
absolute costs of each deliverable warhead in the strategic
reserve decreases. Accordingly, the amount required to
30Tritten, "Scenarios of Nuclear Escalation Dominance
and Vulnerability," p. 19.
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provide a CAB defense also decrease, and provides more
general purpose forces for other missions. Lastly, and,
admittedly, least likely, would be the emergent reguirement
to provide protection of Western SSBNs from Soviet naval
forces. Strategic anti-SSBN ASW by a Soviet fleet which has
fewer SSBNs to protect could lead to a Western pro-SSBN
mission. While some of these advantages could only come
about with reduction in both Western (primarily U.S.) and
Soviet SSBNs, others do not reguire Western "cooperation."
For instance, as the absolute number of U.S. SSBNs
deer eases, each unit grows in relative importance in terms
of percentage of secure reserve warheads held. With the
total Trident force held to a lower number (perhaps 18-20)
,
the Soviets would gladly accept a reduction in their own
number of SSBNs. 31 This would result in a net gain for the
Soviets in terms of land based nuclear warheads which they
could target effectively. This would be advantageous in
terms of the CAB, simply because it reguired less effort to
conduct pro-SSBN operations, and placed greater emphasis on
anti-SSBN operations.
3 . Conclusions
In either case, there is very little to commend in
the CAB for the West in terms of future START treaties. The
SSBN force of the West should not be reduced or compromised
3 Barnes L. George, "The Two Track Dilemma in the START
Negotiations," Strategic Review . Vol. XVI, Winter 1988, pp.
40, 43.
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in any fashion merely to reduce Soviet SSBN holdings.
Soviet SSBNs, in or out of a CAB scheme, do not play the
same central role in the secure strategic reserve as do
SSBNs of the West. Diversity in Soviet strategic reserves
mitigates against a head to head SSBN comparison.
Currently the Soviets would find all the advantages
in a CAB strategy they would hold given a Western commitment
to ASW free zones. In the event the West committed to
maintaining some type of mutual area reserved for each
side's respective SSBNs, the Soviets would have won a major
coup. This would expose the West's SSBN force to precisely
the type of attack the Soviets would perhaps consider given
the current relative nuclear arsenal imbalance: nuclear
barrage.
In any case ASW Free Zones or designated SSBN Patrol
Areas clearly simplifies the Soviet ASW problem. Given the
asymmetry in the Soviet and Western ASW capabilities, the
ASW Free Zone type concept would provide a simplification
they would otherwise not be available to the Soviets in the
near term due to a lack of open ocean search sensors.
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V. DISADVANTAGES OF THE CAB POSTURE
A. INTRODUCTION
The drawbacks to any particular military strategy can
never be fully identified prior to wartime implementation.
In the case of the CAB strategy it is speculative as to what
degree this concept would or could be operationalized (as
would be any projected Soviet deployment posture) . In order
to fully ascertain the utility of the CAB strategy, issues
that would mitigate against the CAB posture must be
examined. This analysis problem can be addressed via
careful scrutiny of perceived Soviet intentions, equipment
capabilities and Soviet perceptions of Western equipment and
intentions. The laboratory environment available to examine
the CAB strategy is one dimensional inasmuch as the Soviets
are not apt to provide detailed operating agendas for their
SSBN fleet. Despite this lack of perfect knowledge
regarding actual Soviet plans, an evaluation must be done
considering four feasible scenarios. By examining these
scenarios, potential shortcomings of the CAB strategy may
become evident.
It is the purpose of this section to examine various
potential shortcomings, vulnerabilities, risks, etc., in the
CAB strategy for the Soviet Union. In so doing it will
become obvious that the disadvantages are primarily a
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function of "worst case" scenarios for the Soviet Union.
The worst case is defined as one in that a nuclear exchange
has occurred which the Soviets did not initiate. This worst
case ultimately results in large number of intercontinental
strikes impacting on Soviet territory. 1 In making the
assumption that only a given number of general wartime
scenarios are relevant, the following sub-sections outline
problems that might arise from a CAB strategy.
1. Short War Scenarios with Initial Conventional
Weapons
In the war scenario that the Soviets would prefer to
fight, the so-called conventional option, the possible
disadvantages to the CAB strategy lie primarily with the
danger of vertical escalation. 2 That is, SSBNs in a CAB
posture would be limited to a degree in their ability to
escalate quickly, losing the short warning time available to
forward deployed SSBNs. In the event the use of SLBMs was
mandated, the disadvantage of lost short warning time might
be eliminated by more rapid delivery of release authority.
1S. Shapiro, "Report on Annual ONI Symposium at
Annapolis", August 24 1981, p. 5. "The Soviets were doing
quite well without war [nuclear] and obviously prefer to
keep it that way."
2McConnell, James, CNA Report No. 82-1885, Alexandria,
Virginia, 1982, p. 2.
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The CAB strategy in a war fought totally conventionally
would generate few problems of import. 3
The short war scenario, which would have the Soviets
seizing much of Western Europe by way of a "blitzkrieg,"
would require the quick collapse of NATO defenses. The
specter of a quick Soviet victory may, however, trigger the
very use of nuclear weapons that the Soviet wish to avoid.
NATO might decide on first use in order to avoid defeat;
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) incentive would be to pre-
empt NATO first use. In either case, the CAB strategy could
be disadvantageous in the following ways. First, NATO
resort to tactical nuclear weapons to attack the CAB
positions inside Soviet territorial seas would entail
horizontal and vertical escalation the Soviets prefer to
avoid. Next, CAB defenses, however well-planned, could fail
so that the Soviet Union could lose enough SSBNs to be
forced with a highly unfavorable "correlation of forces."
In both these areas, the CAB posture could create some
problems as discussed below. This would require that the
West overcome the very significant defenses and tactical
problems presented in CAB defense.
^Obviously, the Soviets would have no way of guarantee-
ing themselves that they could keep a war "conventional,"
given NATO's intentions to use nuclear weapons. NATO
declatory policy [and U.S. policy] is that nuclear weapons
will be used to defend Western Europe. Linkage to a
strategic exchange is provided by Jeffrey Record in NATO '
s
Theater Nuclear Force , Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Inc. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981, p. 18. Warfare is, in
aggregate, a "crapshoot."
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The use of nuclear weapons after a conventional
phase of combat would be escalatory in a vertical sense due
to the crossing of the conventional weapons threshold. In a
horizontal sense, the use of nuclear weapons to attack a CAB
position represents an important escalatory step since the
targets would effectively be located on Soviet sovereign
territory. Clearly, the Soviets do not want to be on the
receiving end of even one nuclear weapon. The implications
for further escalation are obvious. 4 The use of even one
nuclear weapon against the WTO forces the Soviets to make a
decision they would have preferred not make. Namely, the
decision of when to respond, where, and how. In considering
a conventional scenario, it can be assumed the Soviets have
opted not to use nuclear weapons only because it was not to
their advantage to do so. Since CAB positioned SSBNs are
immune from most conventional threats, the introduction of
nuclear weapons endangers their survival.
A shortcoming of the CAB posture as noted earlier is
the point raised by Breemer; locating the SSBNs in a
restricted area solves the most difficult ASW problem,
initial locating information. In a CAB deployment scheme
the SSBNs would be in waters where Western ASW forces could
4 For instance, if the first use of nuclear weapons was
by NATO against second echelon Soviet forces in non-Soviet
Eastern Europe, a WTO/Soviet use against NATO forces at sea
might place some pressure to use nuclear weapons to attack a
known (but unassailable with conventional weapons) CAB
positioned SSBN. Voila, this attack on Soviet territory
might require symbolic matching, perhaps a U.S. shipyard, etc.
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make an attempt, using conventional weapons, however
difficult, to attrite them. The impact of this potential
attrition could have serious implications for the Soviets
perceived "correlation of nuclear forces." The current view
is held by the U.S. Navy that the attrition of these forces
is not likely to escalate an otherwise conventional conflict
to nuclear levels. 5
The conventional means to attrite the SSBNs in CAB
positions available to Western forces are not impressive.
Destruction of SSBNs could be accomplished conventionally
via the standard arsenal of ASW weapons. Since these
weapons must be delivered to within close proximity of the
intended target, CAB defenses should be able to greatly
exacerbate this problem. Table 12 outlines characteristics
of several conventional ASW weapons.
One further conventional weapon does present a
problem for the CAB-protected SSBN. Currently under
development, the Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM) could
penetrate heavily protected coastal waters. The mine
consists of a specially adapted Mk-37 torpedo which would
propel itself away from its delivery platform and go to a
5Ronald O'Rourke, "Nuclear Escalation, Strategic Anti-
submarine Warfare and the Navy's Forward Maritime Strategy,"
Congressional Research Service, Report No. 87-138F, February
27, 1987, pp. 40-42. The possibility of escalation is the
main concern of those who fear attriting the SSBNs. This is
not a valid argument, as the Soviets do not discuss the
requirement to "use or lose" SSBN forces. Clearly, however,




CONVENTIONAL U.S. NAVY ASW WEAPONS
Type
Speed
(pursuit of target) Range
Warhead
Size
MK-46 45 knots 9 km 45 kg
MK-48 50+ knots 46 km 2 67 kg
Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-87. p. 198.
predetermined position and await a suitable target. This
weapon would be ideal to attack a CAB positioned SSBN. 6 By-
inserting these SLMMs into possible CAB waters, the West
could gain several advantages. First, and obviously, a
Soviet SSBN could be destroyed. Secondly, if discovered, a
major minesweeping effort would have to be undertaken, and
may serve to expose exactly where the Soviet SSBNs were, and
lastly, it might divert additional general purpose naval
forces to either counter the threat, or clear the
minefields.
2 . Prolonged Conventional War
Historically military planners have preferred "short
wars" contingency plans. This makes planning politically
palatable, fiscally reasonable and most importantly,
tactically and strategically very difficult. While the
United States maintains (ostensibly) the capability to
mobilize for a three year global war, the Soviets speak of
6Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare , p. 169.
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the possibility of a prolonged conventional war lasting
several years. 7 Prolonged conventional war could pose
several problems or the CAB strategy. First, the longer the
fighting goes on the greater the possibility of the West
discovering the precise locations of the CABs themselves.
Second, SSBN attrition via conventional weapons may create a
problem in terms of the strategic reserve. 8 Third, and
most apt to be exacerbated by the first two, is the
increased difficulty of maintaining SSBN logistical support
during a war that lasts many months, perhaps several years.
The primary weakness of the CAB strategy is that, as
a function of time, the West will learn where the CAB
positions are and attempt to assault them. The ability of
the Soviet navy to protect their SSBNs within the coastal
waters will degrade with time as various Western
intelligence sources marshal their assets for SSBN
detection. Once the CABs are identified a concerted effort
could be made to assault the SSBNs.
A long conventional war would place great demands on
the Soviet coastal "pro-cab" forces. The required upkeep of
7N.V. Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the
Homeland , Foreign Broadcast Information Service, JPRS
L/10412, 15 March 1982. This entire piece is dedicated to
stressing the importance of being able to mobilize the
nation for a long war. Also, "The National Defense
Stockpile Report to Congress," Washington, D.C., August,
1988, p. 20 regarding U.S. mobilization capabilities and
intentions.
8This type of escalation is highly unlikely, "The
National Defense Stockpile Report to Congress," p. 70.
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coastal units protecting the SSBN fleet would be extremely
difficult, exacerbated by the need to maintain some empty
CABs for deception and contingency purposes. This problem
is important, and would further assist the West in
determining the actual positions of the CAB positioned
SSBNs.
One clue to probing Western intelligence services
would be the logistic replenishment of SSBNs. Assuming that
the Yankees and Deltas patrol a notional 70 days and
assuming they were "flushed" to CAB positions prior to the
onset of hostilities, they would need to replenish stocks of
consumables before the war was 90 days old. While deceptive
measures could be undertaken to confuse the West, it would
be extremely difficult to continue this for extended periods
of time. As the war dragged into months (years?) the West
would be able to narrow down the number of likely CAB
positions. This might invite a barrage attack, or a
conventional weapon attack of greater effectiveness.
As noted earlier, the longer the war lasts the
greater the opportunity the West has to alter the size and
composition of the Soviet strategic reserve. While the
SSBNs do not compose the entire strategic reserve, a major
reduction in numbers of warheads could impact the total
capability of the Soviet strategic reserve.
While a prolonged conventional war is not as
beneficial to the Soviets as a shorter war, the CAB posture
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still holds many advantages to the Soviets, if they opted to
employ their navy in operations optimized to undermine the
West's superior industrial potential, i.e., SLOC
interdiction.
3 . Short Nuclear War
Most scenarios hold that the initiation of
hostilities will probably be the culmination of increasing
tensions and strategic warning. 9 While both sides may in
fact dread the "bolt from the blue scenario," it is least
likely.
A short nuclear war could take many forms. For one,
immediate capitulation by one side after initial use, either
tactically in Europe or by use of intercontinental weapons
is conceivable. A short nuclear war could involve a massive
exchange in which war termination would result less from
victory in the classical sense, than from the elimination of
many critical C 3 I functions of both combatants or
exhaustion/destruction of all nuclear assets. In all cases
however, the problems with the CAB strategy lie primarily in
the following forms.
First, the ability to serve as a strategic reserve
could be severely degraded by counterbattery fire from
hostile forces. While the difficulty (indeed, impracticali-
ty) of nuclear counterbattery fire was earlier noted in
9Ashton B. Carter, Managing; Nuclear Operations ,
Brookings Institute Press, Washington, D.C., 1987, pp. 78,
81.
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Chapter III, the possibility of narrowing down the locations
of the CAB well enough to attack these positions with a
reasonable number of weapons would be a problem for Soviet
strategists. Second, a short nuclear exchange might place a
premium on a debilitating first strike to destroy C 3 I and
leadership. In this case, CAB deployment would forfeit the
advantage of forward deployed SSBNs and their ability to
deliver short warning attacks would be lost. Being able to
launch a depressed trajectory shot with a warning time of
less than ten minutes would be critical in a war that the
Soviets intended to start and finish with nuclear weapons.
Lastly, the issue of defense of ballistic missiles via some
type of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) generated weapons
system must be considered. Since by definition the CAB
strategy would place all the SSBNs within Soviet territorial
waters, the ambiguity of azimuth problems for an SDI system
would be resolved. This would likely be more important in a
brief, limited exchange because, although an SDI ABM system
would be an important target for early strikes, the
lethality of the defensive system might require a larger
strike force to be launched to ensure obtaining the required
results.
The ability of the West to localize the possible
positions of Soviet SSBNs within their coastal positions
might leave them open to an attack. While attacking all
potential CAB positions is not practicable, attacking
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perhaps even 200 positions with nuclear weapons could
provide great strategic leverage. There are several factors
to support this. First, some of the 4 50 Minuteman III
missiles that still retain the large one-megaton warhead
could be utilized for this purpose. Second, the CAB
positions themselves would most likely be located in
relatively sparsely populated areas along the coast.
Lastly, in terms of strategic exchange, depleting even all
450 Minuteman II missiles in this role is a veritable
bargain, when it is considered that all Soviet SLBMs would
be destroyed in exchange. Table 13 outlines the
requirements for such a barrage.
TABLE 13
MINIMUM EMT REQUIREMENTS TO BARRAGE SOVIET SSBNS 10
62 (number of SSBNs) x pi (10nm) 2 = 19,468nm2
19,468nm2/51nm2 = 382 aimpoints
382 aimpoints x 1.35 (target error) = 515.3 EMT
(assumes SSBNs located within a 10 nm radius circle)
Source: Strategic Anti-Submarine and Naval Strategy ,
p. 37.
For any of this type of targeting to take place,
however, there must be a high degree of confidence in the
actual deployment sites of the SSBNs. As noted in Chapter
10Carter, Managing Nuclear Operations , p. 38.
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Ill, the ICBMs of the United States are weapons not quickly
replaceable in time of war. In a short nuclear war this
problem would be insignificant, but could become important
in a protracted conflict. By positioning SSBNs in forward
stations the Soviets maintain the ability to execute an
attack which could disrupt the U.S. ability to respond
effectively. 11 Traditionally assumed to be the Yankee class
charged with this mission, an initial strike would degrade
the ability of U.S. intelligence organizations to
effectively track down CAB positions. To engage in this
type of strike, some SSBNs would obviously not be in CAB
positions. Not deploying these forward Yankee class units
prior to the onset of hostilities might give indications of
intentions to fight a conventional war.
In the event a war did ultimately evolve into a
nuclear exchange at the Soviets choice, some advantages
would be lost. Increased tactical warning time for the
United States Ballistic Missile Warning System could be
significant in allowing the United States to respond with a
retaliatory attack. 12 In any case, the cost for the Soviets
in employing a CAB strategy is felt in a war only in which
the Soviets opted not to utilize nuclear weapons initially,
11Ashton B. Carter, Managing Nuclear Operations ,
Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1987, p. 579. Carter
describes a nuclear strike against the metropolitan
Washington, D.C. area, an example of a de-capitating strike.
12 Carter, Managing Nuclear Operations , pp. 298-299.
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and to find then find that forward deployed SLBMs were
required to meet emergent requirements.
If the Soviets opted to launch a surprise nuclear
attack, then the majority of their SSBN fleet could be
positioned in CAB stations. Meanwhile, whatever number of
SSBNs were required to execute the initial strikes could be
forward-deployed. In this way, benefits of both the
strategies could be reaped. However, since the current
Soviet posture seems to be one which favors the conventional
option, this would stand as a net disadvantage to the CAB
theory.
4 . Protracted Nuclear War
A protracted nuclear war can be defined as one in
which an intercontinental exchange takes place over a period
of time that lasts over weeks and months vice days and
hours. This is an important distinction. If the Soviets
have deployed their SSBNs in a CAB posture and intend to
fight a protracted nuclear war they will be disadvantaged as
noted in the preceding sections. However, this would not be
the only problem encountered by the Soviets during a
protracted nuclear war. The other potential problems unique
to the CAB strategy in this scenario is the risk of
detectability-at-launch.
This risk of enemy counter-detection in the wake of
a single-SLBM salvoes can become very serious for three
reasons. First, the SSBN may betray its position, thus
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inviting a counterstike. This is particularly significant
in the CAB, because, unlike open ocean operations, the SSBN
cannot run very far before abandoning its CAB protection.
In an open ocean environment, on the other hand, the SSBN
might be able to outrun the lethal effects of a nuclear
counterbattery fire. 13
Secondly, in firing only one missile tlie SSBN has
given any reasonably close Western ASW assets precise
targeting information to ensure a high probability of an
immediate retaliatory attack. For instance, a Western SSN
loitering outside the limits of the CAB might detect the
SLBM launch and be able to attack with a tactical nuclear
[or even conventional] weapons. Currently the Submarine
Launched Anti-submarine Rocket (SUBROC) has this capability
to attack from a standoff position. Finally, an SSBN
confined to CAB waters may not be able to be used
effectively in a protracted conflict due to limitations on
the missile system. Range constraints would limit the SS-N-
6 to other than intercontinental strikes. The tradeoff
between distance-from-target (and reduced warning time) , and
protection from the CAB would severely hamper the degree of
flexibility available to the Yankee class SSBN.
13Assume a Soviet SSBN fires one SLBM then departs
datum at 25 knots. If the missile is detected simultaneous-
ly, and it takes 4 minutes to retarget an ICBM, and 2 5 more
minutes to arrive, then the SSBN could be anywhere within 490
square miles.
93
B. POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES OF THE CAB
As mentioned earlier, the concept of the "ASW free zone"
is a double-edged sword. On the other hand, an ASW free
zone would afford the noisier and more vulnerable Soviet
SSBNs "legal" protection against Western forces. Converse-
ly, assuming the United States was treaty-bound to maintain
its SSBN assets in ASW free zones, this would greatly
simplify the Soviet problems in pursuing U.S. SSBNs in
wartime, considering the lack of open ocean Soviet search
capability. The U.S. disperses its SSBN force over the
oceans in their entirety to take advantage of their extreme
covert capability, it would be motivated to cheat on the
restriction to confine SSBNs to specific waters. With this
U.S. advantage in cheating in peacetime by continuing
dispersal of SSBNs, and the advantages of both sides of
cheating in wartime, the utility of any ASW free zone is
nil. While the Soviets may extol such measures as
stabilizing and furthering peace, the disadvantages to the
West, and eventually to the Soviets outweigh any possible
gains.
C. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the CAB strategy is of little use to the
Soviet Union in waging a war in which it intends to use
nuclear weapons in the initial stages. Further, in a war
which develops into a limited exchange, the CABs provide
several disadvantages which could be significant. Clearly,
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the CAB strategy is not a strategy optimized for the Soviets
to initiate nuclear war involving SLBMs.
If the Soviet Union is willing to consider a disarming
first strike against U.S. strategic forces, the CAB strategy
will serious impede them from successful execution of this
task. Additionally, the use of the CAB might invite the
United States to consider a nuclear barrage (given it had
adequate locating data on the Soviet SSBN force) , escalation
that would by definition involve nuclear weapons detonating
on Soviet internal waters. This is a very serious
shortcoming of the CAB strategy.
The disadvantages of the CAB are by and large problems
which would arise in a nuclear war. A shift in Soviet
policy back toward a primarily nuclear option would make the
CAB strategy less attractive. However, since the current
consensus is that the Soviets would, for the time being,
prefer the conventional option, the CAB does present




An examination of possible Soviet military strategies
must include analysis of capabilities and intentions. This
can only be done via examination of Soviet weapons systems
and Soviet military literature. Matching these two
components together, in light of the possible political-
military goals of the Soviet Union, can shed some light on
the way in which the SSBN fleet will be used. As noted
earlier in Chapter III, the Soviets currently view the
conventional option as the primary option in waging war with
the West. With this in mind several further conclusions can
be drawn.
First, the Soviets face a choice of basic strategies,
and the incumbent constraints each strategic choice
automatically entails. To plan to fight conventionally
first is by definition to not optimize for nuclear warfare.
Clearly, thought must be given to the implications of any
strategy on nuclear warfighting capability. Some
degradation in overall capability may be acceptable, given
that it can maximize overall success for the war being
planned. Since even in a degraded mode the Soviet's nuclear
components are quite capable of fighting and serving as a
strategic reserve, in order to increase chances for
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conventional victory the Soviets may accept the minimal
degradation inherent in a CAB strategy. Whether they would
or would not is not the question. The fact is there is very
little to support the Soviets executing any strategy at sea,
short of that which supports the battle ashore.
Secondly, the entire CAB concept would be less plausible
had it not been found in Soviet literature. Therefore, it
is important to consider carefully the various aspects of a
CAB strategy as they appear in Soviet literature. Soviet
keying on the ease of command, control and communications
and the importance of limiting wear and tear on equipment
are important considerations that bear serious
consideration. Of course, in Soviet literature, as in
either the Old or New Testament, almost any contention can
find a supporting quotation. So it is with the CAB. The
Soviets say precious little specifically regarding their
SSBN force. However, the Soviets are seemingly given to
comment on Western navies, using these navies as a surrogate
for their own problems and ideas. Accordingly, the Soviet
professional naval journal, Morskov Sbornik , does discuss
various U.S. SSBN programs and their possible deployment
schemes. It has never been the plan to shepherd U.S. SSBNs
into coastal waters, yet the Soviets point out the
advantages in so doing. Again, very little has been said by
the Soviets themselves regarding SSBN operations and
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capabilities; these issue are only discussed in third party
analogies.
Lastly, the problem of hardware must be reviewed. Since
equipment can only act within its design limits, its range
of capabilities are more clearly defined. In terms of the
CAB, missile range and overall submarine quieting are the
two key issues that drive SSBN strategy. Soviet submarines
possess SLBMs of significant range, while emitting noise
levels which make them relatively vulnerable vis a vis their
Western counterparts. Thus, some reconciliation must be
made in terms of survivable operations. In a posture
optimized for a conventional war, the CAB takes advantage of
Soviet SSBN strengths and covers for their weaknesses.
This issue of reconciliation with respect to the
composition of the Soviet fleet and the minimal credit it is
given for forward operations is further resolved by the CAB
strategy. This large fleet has capabilities which would be
a diseconomy, indeed counterproductive, in a force not
intended to undertake offensive missions.
In terms of warfighting utility it is myopic and overly
hopeful to assume away the primary maritime problem of
fighting a conventional war, maintaining the SLOCS open for
resupply. If the primary theater of potential warfare
continues to be Western Europe, the successful interdiction
of the SLOCs would be disastrous for the West. If the
Soviets were willing to hazard [and hazard only to a very
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small degree] their SSBN force via the CAB strategy, the
Soviet navy could play the only role the Soviet army would
have it play: disrupt the movement of men and munitions to
Western Europe. As noted earlier, this does not have to be
done extremely well to be effective.
Further research may disclose other data to either
support or refute the CAB strategy. Clearly, any
information which lends support to the bastion theory
supports peripherally the CAB strategy. Continued Soviet
deployment of massive numbers of coastal vessels, and naval
exercises which support forward operations are evidence of
the Soviet intention to use their navy for more traditional
tasks.
In closing it seems prudent to repeat Winston
Churchill's assertion that the Soviet Union is an enigma,
wrapped in puzzle inside a riddle. No one answer will
suffice to meet every parameter of the Soviet navy. The CAB
is an attempt to logically employ the navy the Soviets have
built within the strategy they seem to espouse. Two things
are obvious. First, the CAB strategy can only be proven by
force of arms, Second, proving or disproving a pre-war
theory is of utility only in the deterring of war via
correct prediction of the potential enemies intentions and
planning accordingly. Napoleon Bonaparte once offered that
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